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MAARTJE DE VISSER*
A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice
Commission in Processes of Domestic
Constitutional Reformt
Since its inception in 1990, the services of the European Commis-
sion for Democracy Through Law-more commonly known as the
Venice Commission-to advise and assist on constitutional reform
projects have been engaged with a growing frequency, by both Euro-
pean and non-European states. This development means that the
Venice Commission is rapidly becoming an actor of significance in
constitutional engineering and, further, that its involvement in
processes of constitutional change across different jurisdictions may
generate convergence in national constitutional designs and ap-
proaches. This Article offers an analysis of the Venice Commission's
performance of this role, using its recent participation in constitu-
tional reform projects in Iceland, Tunisia, Belgium, and Hungary as
case studies. More particularly, it questions whether the current ap-
proach of the Venice Commission-characterized by virtually
unbridled flexibility and pragmatism-is still appropriate given its
evolution into an internationally recognized, independent authority on
constitutional matters. The Article argues that safeguarding, and ide-
ally enhancing, the quality and acceptability of the opinions prepared
by the Venice Commission for the benefit of national constitution mak-
ers calls for a more elaborate set of procedural rules governing its
working methods and a greater degree of sophistication in identifying
the shared constitutional standards used to evaluate constitutional
changes contemplated by its member states. The Commission should
further be more attentive to the implications of having a growing num-
ber of non-European states among its members and take measures to
ensure that all its members are treated in a consistent fashion and
with due regard for their equality in status as democratic nations.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 26, 2014, an overwhelming majority of the National
Constituent Assembly of Tunisia approved the country's new consti-
tution. Drafted in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, the
constitution received considerable international critical acclaim, re-
garding the manner in which the text had been drafted and adopted
as well as its content, notably the entrenchment of a host of funda-
mental rights and liberties.1 Comparisons have inevitably been
drawn with Egypt's new constitution and those of other Arab na-
tions, 2 with the Tunisian text hailed as one of the most progressive in
the region, providing the foundations for a modern and credible de-
mocracy.3 In accomplishing this feat, the constitution's drafters were
assisted by the European Commission for Democracy Through Law,
better known as the Venice Commission 4-something that has, how-
ever, not been widely recognized. And the Tunisians are not alone.
Since the Venice Commission's inception in 1990, its services to ad-
vise and assist on constitutional reform projects have been engaged
with a growing frequency, by both European and non-European
states. This development means that the Venice Commission is rap-
idly becoming an actor of significance in constitutional engineering
and, further, that its involvement in processes of constitutional
change across different jurisdictions may generate convergence in na-
tional constitutional designs and approaches. Somewhat
surprisingly, however, the work of the Commission appears to have
largely escaped academic notice. 5 This neglect is all the more stark
1. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, Tunisian Constitution, Praised for Balance, Nears
Passage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014101/15/world/africa/
tunisian-constitution-praised-for-balance-nears-passage.html; Foreign Leaders Hail
Tunisia's Constitution, AL JAZEERA, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/afri
ca/2014/02/foreign-leaders-hail-tunisia-constitution-201427144047687702.html; EU
Hails Tunisia Political Process, Expresses Concern over Egypt, EURACTIV, Feb. 11,
2014, http://www.euractiv.com/east-mediterranean/eu-hails-tunisia-political-proce-
news-533413.
2. On the political transformations in the Middle East, see, e.g., Sujit Choudhry,
Constitutional Transitions in the Middle East: Introduction, 11 INT'L J. CONST. L. 611
(2013); John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise
of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 219 (2013).
3. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Statement on the Adoption of Tunisia's
New Constitution (Jan. 26, 2014); Editorial, Tunisia's Remarkable Achievement, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/opinion/tunisias-remarka
ble-achievement.html.
4. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE/VENICE
COMMISSION, http://www.venice.coe.intlWebForms/pages/?p=0 lPresentation.
5. Those articles and book chapters that do deal with the Venice Commission
have typically been written by its individual members and tend to be descriptive
rather than evaluative in nature; see, e.g., Giorgio Malinverni, La reconciliation el
travers l'assistance constitutionnelle aux pays de l'Europe de l'est : le r6le de la Com-
mission de Venise, 10 LES CAHIERS DE LA PAIX 207 (2004) (Fr.); Jacques Robert, La
Commission europdenne pour la ddmocratie par le droit dite , Commission de Venise ,
in LA C.S.C.E. : DIMENSION HUMAINE ET RtGLEMENT DES DIFFPRENDS 255 (Emmanuel
Decaux & Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos eds., 1993); Gianni Buquicchio & Pierre Gar-
[Vol. 63964
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given that formal changes to constitutional arrangements are gener-
ally on the rise. 6
This Article highlights the responsibilities of the Venice Commis-
sion and the manner in which it pursues its principal objective of
providing advice in constitution making. Part I traces the origins of
this body and discusses how it has slowly but surely become a "genu-
ine body providing internationally recognized and independent
opinion" ("vritable instance de rdflexion indpendante reconnue in-
ternationalement").7 Part of the explanation can be found in the
activism with which the Venice Commission has interpreted its man-
date, while the possibility for non-European states to accede to its
Statute has enabled its evolution into a truly transnational consulta-
tive body on constitutional matters. In Part II, I offer an in-depth
exploration of the approach adopted by the Venice Commission when
assisting countries contemplating changes to their constitutional ar-
rangements. Focusing on its involvement in recent constitutional
reform projects in Iceland, Tunisia, Belgium, and Hungary, the Arti-
cle illustrates the flexibility that is currently characteristic of the
Commission's working methods, and demonstrates how this ap-
proach may inadvertently undermine the quality and usefulness of
its assistance to national constitution makers. In Part III, I suggest
ways in which this situation can be ameliorated. Subpart A focuses
on changes to the Venice Commission's Rules of Procedure, while
Subpart B advocates moderation in identifying and articulating the
yardsticks that it uses when evaluating proposed constitutional re-
forms. Finally, Subpart C considers how the Commission can deal
with the ramifications of its geographical expansion.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE VENICE COMMISSION'S RISE TO PROMINENCE
AS AN EXPERT CONSULTATIVE BODY ON CONSTITUTIONAL
MATTERS
The Venice Commission can be said to have been the brainchild
of Antonio La Pergola, who in the late 1980s, as Italy's Minister for
rone, L'harmonisation du droit constitutionnel europden : La contribution de la
Commission europdenne pour la ddmocratie par le droit, 3 UNIFORM L. REV. / REVUE DE
DROIT UNIFORME 323 (1998); Rudolf "Schnutz" Durr, The Venice Commission, in INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 151 (Jan
Wouters ed., 2010).
6. See, e.g., the data on the promulgation of new constitutions collected in the
context of the Comparative Constitutions Project of Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg,
and James Melton, available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-visuali
zations/; Justin Blount, Participation in Constitutional Design, in COMPARATIVE CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 38 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (noting that "[olurs
is an era of constitution-making").
7. Jean-Charles Engel, La Commission europdenne pour la dmocratie par le
droit, dite < Commission de Venise ": cadre et acteur privilgigs de coopgration en ma-
tiere de justice constitutionnelle, in MALANGES EN L'HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR JEAN
Touscoz 867, 869 (2007).
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European Affairs, mooted the setting up of a body devoted to cultivat-
ing respect for democracy and the rule of law." At his instigation, a
conference was held in Venice in January 1990 in which all of the
parties to the Council of Europe participated, with several countries
from Central and Eastern Europe in attendance as observers. The
outcome of the conference was an agreement to establish the Com-
mission for Democracy through Law-referred to as the Venice
Commission, after the Italian city where its meetings take place-
under the aegis of the Council of Europe.9 This decision was largely
inspired by the iconic fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Commu-
nism in Central and Eastern Europe. Expecting, and also desiring, a
regime change, the then-members of the Council of Europe were keen
to facilitate democratic transition in those countries by setting up an
institution devoted to providing assistance in restructuring constitu-
tional arrangements. 10
The Venice Commission's official nomenclature indicates the fo-
cus that this body is to adopt in its work." In the words of one of its
members:
[O]ne cannot have a true democracy without a suitable legal
framework providing rules for the correct functioning of
democratic institutions. It should also be noted that democ-
racy is only true if the will of the people is properly
expressed in the form of law. The adoption of legal form pro-
vides a guarantee against the arbitrariness of the exercise of
power.12
More precisely, the Statute of the Venice Commission instructs it to
enhance the mutual understanding of domestic legal systems in order
to bring these systems closer, promote the rule of law and democracy,
8. Jeffrey Jowell, The Venice Commission: Disseminating Democracy Through
Law, 24 PuB. L. 675, 675 (2001).
9. The initial agreement created the Venice Commission for a transitional two-
year period, with the Council of Europe being invited to explore possibilities to include
this body within its fold. The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers officially
established the Venice Commission with Resolution 90(6), adopted May 10, 1990.
10. This belief is clearly reflected in the original text of the Venice Commission
Statute, with the first sentence of its first article declaring that the Commission was
to cooperate with members and non-members of the Council of Europe, "in particular
those of Central and Eastern Europe." Statute of the European Commission for De-
mocracy Through Law, being the Appendix to Council of Europe [CE], Comm. of
Ministers [CM]/Res(90)6E, On a Partial Agreement Establishing the European Com-
mission for Democracy Through Law, 86th Sess., art. 1 (May 10, 1990) [hereinafter
Venice Comm'n Statute (original)].
11. Cf Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy Through
Law, adopted by CE, CM/Res(2002)3E, 784th Mtg. of the Ministers' Deputies, art. 1
(Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Venice Comm'n Statute].
12. Sergio Bartole, Final Remarks: The Role of the Venice Commission, 26 REv.
CENT. & E. EuR. L. 351, 351 (2000).
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and identify ways to improve the functioning of democratic
institutions.
While the activities undertaken by the Venice Commission in
pursuit of its objectives are multifaceted and diverse, three main
planks may be identified. It should at the same time, however, be
acknowledged that the different activities are mutually reinforcing
and best conceived as situated along a continuum.
First, the Commission acts as a constitutional "helpdesk" provid-
ing assistance to individual countries as regards constitutional
questions pertaining specifically to them. In line with the impetus for
its establishment, it prepares opinions on (draft) constitutions and
amendments as well as on legislation within the constitutional do-
main. 13 The Venice Commission can furthermore provide guidance as
to the correct interpretation of national constitutional provisions in
force. Constitutional courts may request amicus curiae opinions, in
which the Commission analyzes the constitutional issue at stake
from a comparative and/or international perspective, while leaving it
to the requesting court to determine whether the statute under re-
view comports with the constitution. Besides constitutional courts,
the Commission also makes itself available to national ombudsmen
through amicus ombud opinions.
Secondly, the Venice Commission also deals with what it calls
"transnational issues," that is to say, constitutional matters whose
relevance extends beyond any one state. On the one hand, the Com-
mission organizes scientific seminars and conferences under the
aegis of its University for Democracy (UniDem) program and the re-
ports presented and discussed during these events are subsequently
published as part of the Council of Europe's Science and Technique of
Democracy series. On the other hand, the Venice Commission draws
up studies and reports on a wide range of salient constitutional mat-
ters. These reports can form the basis for the preparation of
guidelines or codes of good practice, as has happened for instance
with regard to the banning of political parties 14 or holding of referen-
dums, 15 or they can serve as a springboard for the drafting of
international conventions, with the framework convention for the
protection of national minorities being the paradigmatic example.
The final type of activity targets the actual application of consti-
tutional principles and values, and consists of cooperation with
national constitutional courts and increasingly also with associations
13. This latter category covers laws governing the functioning of state institu-
tions, dealing inter alia with constitutional courts, ombudsmen, and the exercise of
human rights.
14. CE, Venice Comm'n, Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political
Parties and Analogous Measures, Doc. CDL-INF(2000)I (Dec. 10-11, 1999).
15. CE, Venice Comm'n, Code of Good Practice on Referendums, Doc. CDL-
AD(2007)008rev (Mar. 16-17, 2007).
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bringing together these judicial bodies on a regional or linguistic
basis.16
Over the course of the past three decades, the Venice Commis-
sion has acquired a reputation as an authoritative consultative body
on constitutionalism and democracy 17 due to the interplay of a vari-
ety of factors. One of these pertains to its institutional design. The
Venice Commission is charged with performing its mandate indepen-
dently:' 8 while the governments of its member states each appoint
two individuals to the Commission to actually carry out its various
activities, these persons are explicitly required to "serve in their per-
sonal capacity" and they "shall not receive or accept any
instructions."19 This makes the Venice Commission a more palatable
choice as an external participant in domestic constitution-making
processes than foreign states or international financial institutions,
who may be suspected of unwanted partisanship and placing their
own interests before those of the constitution makers in question. 20
What is more, these individual Commission members should be per-
sons of high standing as a result of their involvement with democratic
institutions or through their contribution to the fields of law or politi-
cal science, and may be assisted by external experts when such is
considered necessary.21 With many leading professors of law and (for-
mer) constitutional court justices as members, the Venice
Commission can readily tap into a wealth of constitutional knowledge
and experience, which further enhances its attractiveness for consti-
tutional framers seeking advice on, or international approbation of,
their efforts.22
There is next the issue of fortuitous timing: as we have seen, the
Venice Commission was established just prior to the "burst of consti-
16. Cf Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 3(4).
17. See, e.g., Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, The Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe-Standards and Impact, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579, 584 (2014); Eric Maulin,
Foreword to ALAIN DE BENOIST, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREEDOMS 9, 17
(2011). Other Council of Europe bodies-such as the Parliamentary Assembly, the
Committee of Ministers, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)-also
regularly express their appreciation for the work of the Venice Commission. See, e.g.,
Dean Spielmann, President of the ECtHR, Address at the Venice Commission's 100th
Plenary Session (Oct. 10, 2014), available at http://echr.coe.int/Documents/
Speech_20141010_OVSpielmannFRA.pdf (in French).
18. See also Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 1.
19. Id. Their term of office is four years, and this term may be renewed
indefinitely.
20. See, e.g., Zaid Al-Ali, Constitutional Drafting and External Influence, in COM-
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 77.
21. Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, arts. 2, 5.
22. For example, in 1998 Albania's Constitutional Committee purposely sought
(and obtained) the Venice Commission's imprimatur of the final draft of the country's
new constitution "to lend the draft legitimacy and to neutralize [former president]
Berisha's attempts to discredit it" (reported in Constitutional Watch: Albania, 7 E.
EUR. CONST. REV. no. 2, 1998, at 2, 2).
[Vol. 63
ROLE OF THE VENICE COMMISSION
tutionalization"23 in Central and Eastern Europe. 24 Not only was it
the first-and for a long time the only-international body dedicated
exclusively to accumulating and dispensing constitutional thinking
in that part of the world, it was immediately able to get to work and
demonstrate its usefulness in practice. The manner in which it did so
when its assistance was initially solicited-recall also the quality of
its individual members-enabled the Venice Commission to establish
a solid track record as a competent advisor on constitutional matters.
This, in turn, has had an impact on the inclination of other nations to
seek the Commission's opinion in appropriate cases or at least be as-
sociated with its work.
Another relevant factor in this context is the broad understand-
ing that the Venice Commission has accorded to its mandate since its
inception. It appreciated the need for a comprehensive approach to
the provision of constitutional assistance, whereby attention should
also be devoted to the practical implementation and operation of new
constitutional arrangements to ensure that these are actually able to
deliver the anticipated results. This entailed the Commission engag-
ing in activities that were not envisaged by its founders and for which
its Statute accordingly provided no clear legal basis, notably in the
field of constitutional justice. Crucially, this overt display of activism
has not attracted criticism; instead, the Commission has been com-
mended for its prescience in recognizing the importance of "aftercare"
services. This, in turn, has shaped the perception among stakehold-
ers of the Commission as a valuable institution. What is more,
proceeding in this manner has yielded strategic benefits: the
perceived importance of quasi-constitutional legislation and constitu-
tional practice ensures the Venice Commission's continued relevance
even when formal constitutional changes are few and far between.
Finally, the geographical expansion of the Venice Commission
both exemplifies and advances its reputation. Although the Commis-
sion was established by eighteen Western European member states,
the 1990s were a decade of great eastward enlargement, with the ac-
cession of post-Communist states. A radical change was brought
about in 2002, when the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe amended the Statute to allow non-European states to become
23. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 715 (2001).
24. The body of literature on the democratic transitions in Central and Eastern
Europe is vast. See, e.g., ADAM CZARNOTA ET AL., RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER
COMMUNISM (2005); THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE (Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999); RUDOLF L.
TOILs, HUNGARY'S NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC REFORM, SOCIAL CHANGE AND
POLITICAL SUCCESSION (1996); Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Re-
form in Czechoslovakia: A Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (1991).
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full members of the Venice Commission. 25 Their decision was princi-
pally inspired by the interest expressed by many such countries in
the latter's work, and clearly showcases the esteem in which the Ven-
ice Commission and its activities are held.26 In part thanks to this
change, the Commission's membership today stands at sixty.27 The
relaxation of the admission criteria has enabled the accession of
countries in Africa (Morocco and Algeria joined in 2007, Tunisia fol-
lowed suit in 2010); the Americas (Chile became a member in 2005,
Peru and Brazil in 2009, and Mexico in 2010, with the United States
being granted full membership in 2013); Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan
was the first non-European country to accede in 2004, with Kazakh-
stan joining in 2012); East Asia (Korea became a member in 2006);
and the Middle East (with Israel having acceded in 2008).28 By the
same token, as its membership grows, so too does the impetus for
other countries to consider the prospect of partaking in the work of
the Venice Commission. It will be interesting to see in particular
whether the recent accession of the United States will have a knock-
on effect.
The Commission's geographical expansion has important conse-
quences. For one, it means that today it is no longer merely a pan-
European institution. While not yet a fully-fledged global player, it
can now be considered as properly international or transnational in
stature. For another, the spate of accessions made possible by the
2002 amendment may eventually be the catalyst for reflections on
the continued appropriateness of the Venice Commission's "Euro-
pean-ness," currently evident both in its official nomenclature and, to
a considerable extent, also in its work, as will be elaborated below.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE VENICE COMMISSION
IN PROCESSES OF FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE WITH
REFERENCE TO FouR RECENT CASE STUDIES
The focus in this Part and the next will be on what can be consid-
ered the Venice Commission's archetypal activity, namely the
provision of guidance at times when its member countries decide to
25. Article 4 of the Statute of the Council of Europe states that only "European"
states are eligible to join this organization. Statute of the Council of Europe art. 4,
opened for signature May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, E.T.S. No. 001 (entered into force
Aug. 3, 1949), as amended by E.T.S. Nos. 6, 7, 8, 11.
26. It has always been possible for non-member states to "benefit from the activi-
ties of the Commission." Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 3(3); Venice
Comm'n Statute (original), supra note 10, art. 2(3).
27. During its 1202nd meeting (June 10-11, 2014), the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe accepted Kosovo's request to become the Commission's newest
member.
28. In addition, Belarus holds the status of associate member and Argentina, Ca-
nada, the Holy See, Japan, and Uruguay are involved in the Commission's work as
observers.
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overhaul, revise, or introduce their constitution or quasi-constitu-
tional statutes. To capture how the Commission goes about the
performance of this core task demands an analysis that is informed
by its recent practical experiences. To this end, this Article examines
four case studies in considerable detail: Iceland, Tunisia, Belgium,
and Hungary. These countries are all full members of the Venice
Commission; and since the Commission's involvement in their respec-
tive domestic constitutional reform processes took place within the
last five years, a contemporary account can thus be provided. The
sampling of the countries further represents established (Belgium,
Iceland), maturing (Hungary), and young democracies (Tunisia),
which are moreover located in different corners of the Venice Com-
mission's geographical sphere.
A. The Provision of Constitutional Assistance: A Primer
It is expedient to begin by briefly introducing the Venice Com-
mission's working method, as this will serve as a useful reference
point for the discussion of the four case studies to follow.
The Commission's Statute, drawn up by the Committee of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe, is virtually silent on the procedure that
governs the preparation of opinions on draft constitutions and quasi-
constitutional legislation. It only specifies which entities can engage
the services of the Venice Commission.29 The member states them-
selves have the possibility of doing so and are, unsurprisingly,
responsible for the bulk of requests for guidance. 30 In addition, the
other organs of the Council of Europe31 and international organiza-
tions32 may ask the Venice Commission to evaluate its members'
(quasi-) constitutional documents. For countries deciding whether to
join the Commission, they thus ought to be aware that the Venice
Commission can-and sometimes does-pronounce on the merits of
constitutional changes unasked or even against the wishes of the
states in question. The Rules of Procedure formulated by the Venice
Commission itself3 3 are otherwise scant regarding its working
method. Article 14 stipulates that "as a general rule," one or more
rapporteurs-chosen from the individual members appointed by the
state governments-will be tasked with preparing a draft opinion on
the constitutional arrangements under review, and that outside ex-
29. Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 3(2).
30. Each state decides for itself which domestic institutions are empowered to so-
licit the Commission's assistance. These normally include governments, individual
ministries, and parliaments.
31. In practice, the Parliamentary Assembly and Secretary General regularly en-
gage the services of the Venice Commission.
32. This notably includes the European Union, as provided by the Venice Comm'n
Statute, supra note 11, art. 2(6).
33. See id. art. 4(4).
2015]
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perts may be invited to join as advisors. Article 14a allows for the
release of draft opinions to the requesting body in urgent cases so
that it may take cognizance of the Venice Commission's views at a
point in time when its recommendations can still be taken into ac-
count. Finally, the Rules of Procedure contain provisions governing
the voting on and formal adoption of opinions as Venice Commission
texts during one of the body's quarterly Plenary Sessions.34
Somewhat curiously, neither the Statute nor the Rules of Proce-
dure explicitly specify the standards that the Venice Commission-
and initially its rapporteurs-should use when examining the quality
of national (quasi-) constitutional texts. It would, however, be incor-
rect to conclude that the Venice Commission is unfettered in deciding
on the yardsticks to be applied. The Statute of the Council of Europe
proclaims one of its principal aims to be "safeguarding and realising
the ideals and principles which are [the members'] common heri-
tage,"35 and as the Council's official advisor on constitutional affairs,
this goal also informs the work of the Venice Commission. Indeed, the
relevance of this concept for the Venice Commission is acknowledged
in writings by a number of its (former) individual members and in
several of its reports and studies.36
The "common heritage" comprises three broad principles: respect
for fundamental rights, democracy, and the rule of law. For these
principles to be meaningful yardsticks, further concretization is nec-
essary. This is accomplished in part through international
conventions concluded under the aegis of the Council of Europe. For
fundamental rights, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and the interpretation of its provisions by the Strasbourg
Court are typically accorded pride of place; for democracy, reference
is made inter alia to the organization of regular and free elections as
guaranteed under the first Protocol to the ECHR. Another fruitful
source of inspiration in fleshing out the common heritage is the na-
tional constitutions of the member states. These foundational texts
34. CE, Venice Comm'n, Revised Rules of Procedure arts. 12-13, Doc. CDL-
AD(2013)031, adopted at 50th Plenary Sess. (Mar. 8-9, 2002), as amended 53rd Ple-
nary Sess. (Dec. 13-14, 2002), 61st Plenary Sess. (Dec. 2-3, 2004), 96th Plenary Sess.
(Oct. 11-12, 2013). Opinions are adopted by simple majority and require a quorum of
a majority of Commission members.
35. See Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 25, pmbl. 3, art. 1 ("the
spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of [its members'] peoples
and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, princi-
ples which form the basis of all genuine democracy").
36. See, e.g., Gianni Buquicchio & Pierre Garrone, Vers un espace constitutionnel
commun? Le role de la Commission de Venise, in LAw IN GREATER EUROPE: TOWARDS A
COMMON LEGAL AREA; STUDIES IN HONOUR OF HEINRICH KLEBES 3 (Bruno Haller et al.
eds., 2000); Bartole, supra note 12; Christos Giakoumopoulos, La contribution du
Conseil d'Europe aux rdformes constitutionnelles : l'action de la Commission de Venise,
in THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN TODAY'S EUROPE 695 (Giuliano Amato et al. eds.,
2002); THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF EUROPE (SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF DE-
MOCRACY, No. 18) (Venice Commission ed., 1996).
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have been relied on by the Venice Commission to identify the right of
enterprise, the separation of powers,37 and the supremacy of the law
as more specific review standards among other features. 38
The analysis of four case studies below demonstrates the consid-
erable discretion that the Venice Commission possesses at present to
organize its work, while also illustrating the existence of commonali-
ties in the procedural steps usually taken. At the same time, it
reveals that there are gratuitous inconsistencies in the manner in
which the substantive evaluation of domestic constitutional texts is
carried out and, in a related vein, highlights missed opportunities to
give optimal guidance to national constitutional drafters.
B. Iceland: Overhauling the Postwar Constitution
One of the early European casualties of the recent global finan-
cial crisis was Iceland, which in late 2008 saw the complete meltdown
of its banking system and the threat of national bankruptcy, necessi-
tating a bailout by the International Monetary Fund.39 The collapse
of the country's economic and financial system precipitated the fall of
the government in January of the following year, amidst public un-
rest and mass demonstrations. These events were the catalysts for a
revision of the country's hastily drafted postwar constitution. As
could be expected, any new text was expected to lay the foundations
for restoring citizens' trust in state institutions and their functioning,
as well as for safeguards that should reduce the likelihood of a repeti-
tion of calamities of this nature.
The preparation of a proposal for a new Icelandic Constitution
was entrusted to a specially established twenty-five-member consti-
tutional council. 40 In a move that has attracted considerable
37. Understood as the possibility of a democratic alteration of power. See Domi-
nique Rousseau, The Concept of European Constitutional Heritage, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF EUROPE (SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY, No.
18), supra note 36, at 16, 23-24.
38. The examination of national constitutional orders to identify elements of the
common heritage is usually entrusted by the Commission's Plenary to a small work-
ing group, which draws up a study or report on a matter of general interest to this
end. UniDem seminars provide an additional avenue for such work.
39. See, e.g., Simon Bowers, Iceland Banking Collapse: Diary of a Death Spiral,
GUARDIAN, June 26, 2012, http://www.theguardian.combusiness/2012/un/26/iceland-
banking-collapse-diary-death-spiral; Eric Pfanner, Iceland Is All But Officially Bank-
rupt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/world
business/09iht-icebank.4.16827672.html.
40. Initially, it was envisaged that this work would be carried out by a popularly
elected constitutional assembly, for which ordinary Icelanders could stand as candi-
dates. See Proposition 90/2010 Log um stj6rnlagaping [Act on a Constitutional
Assembly], June 25, 2010, arts. 1-5 (Ice.). Following the invalidation of the election by
the H-estardttar Islands (Supreme Court of Iceland), the Icelandic parliament decided
to appoint a constitutional council instead and offered the twenty-five candidates that
had received the highest number of votes in the elections for the constitutional assem-
bly a seat on this council.
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attention,41 the council elicited the input of the public at large
throughout its work,42 including through the extensive use of crowd-
sourcing techniques via social media channels. The draft
constitutional text produced by the council was submitted to the Ice-
landic parliament (the Althingi) and was subsequently presented to
the population in a consultative referendum in October 2012, with
two thirds of voters indicating that this draft should form the basis of
a legislative bill for a new Icelandic Constitution. Following legal-
technical revision and a few substantive changes to the council's pro-
posal,43 the Althingi's Constitutional and Supervisory Committee
contacted the Venice Commission a month later, requesting its opin-
ion on the bill setting out the proposed constitutional
arrangements. 44 A working group was formed for this purpose com-
prising five rapporteurs: two professors of law (Jan Helgesen from
Norway and Jean-Claude Scholsem from Belgium), two former con-
stitutional court justices (Jacqueline de Guillenchmidt from France
and Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem from Germany), and the Danish
Ombudsman (Jorgen Sorensen), all of whom were serving as mem-
bers of the Venice Commission at that time. To enable an informed
examination, the requesting parliamentary committee organized a
two-day country visit in January 2013, during which the rapporteurs
were able to discuss the constitutional text with the relevant Ice-
landic stakeholders. The rapporteurs finished their work the
following month, and the Plenary of the Venice Commission debated
and formally adopted its opinion on the draft Icelandic Constitution
in March 2013.4 5
41. See, e.g., Anne Meuwese, Popular Constitution-Making: The Case of Iceland,
in THE SOCIAL AND POLITIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 469 (Denis J. Galligan
& Mila Versteeg eds., 2013); BALDVIN THOR BERGSSON & PAUL BLOKKER, The Consti-
tutional Experiment in Iceland, in VERFASSUNGGEBUNG IN KONSOLIDIERTEN
DEMOKRATIEN: NEUBEGINN ODER VERFALL EINES POLITISCHEN SYSTEMS? 154 (Ellen Bos
& Kdlmdn P6cza eds., 2013); H6lene Landemore, Inclusive Constitution-Making: The
Icelandic Experiment, 22 J. POL. PHIL. 1 (2014).
42. Proposition 90/2010 Log um stj6rnlagaping art. 20 (Ice.).
43. For instance, the constitutional council's draft did not define the Evangelical
Lutheran Church as the national church, leaving this to be regulated by law, but the
final text of the constitutional bill continues to guarantee it this status.
44. While some might speculate that there was a connection between this request
and Iceland's application for European Union (EU) membership in July 2009, the par-
liamentary committee appeared motivated by purely domestic political factors. See
CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 702/2013 on the Draft New Constitution of Iceland, Doc.
CDL-AD(2013)010 (Mar. 8-9, 2013) 16; Smri McCarthy, Utopia Lost: Lessons from
Iceland, CONSTITUTIONUK (Jan. 21, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/constitutionud2014/
01/21/utopia-lost-lessons-from-iceland/. Secondly, the European Commission (which
advises the other EU institutions on whether accession negotiations should be
opened) had, by the time of the Venice Commission's opinion, already concluded that
the preexisting political arrangements did not preclude Iceland's application for EU
membership. Commission Opinion on Iceland's Application for Membership of the Eu-
ropean Union, at 5, 7, COM(2010)62 (Feb. 24, 2010).
45. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 702/2013 on the Draft New Constitution of Ice-
land, supra note 44.
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While the Venice Commission applauded various elements of the
proposal and the participatory character of the drafting process,
there was also criticism. It expressed concern about the generality of
the terms in which numerous provisions, including those guarantee-
ing fundamental rights, were cast, cautioning that a lack of precision
"may lead to serious difficulties of interpretation and application." 46
The Commission was furthermore apprehensive about the complexity
of the institutional arrangements governing the relationship between
parliament, the government, and the president, as well as about the
modalities for public participation both during elections and through
referendums. This, it feared, could bring with it "the risk of political
blockage and instability, which may seriously undermine the coun-
try's good governance."47 In view of upcoming parliamentary
elections in Iceland, the Venice Commission finally suggested that
the national authorities contemplate the possibility of just simplify-
ing the procedure for constitutional revision at this juncture and
deferring to the newly elected parliament the task of deliberating on
the improvements to be made to the text of the new constitution. This
is more or less what happened.48 At the time of writing, the postwar
Constitution of Iceland remains in force.
Reflecting upon the quality of the analysis of the bill for a new
Icelandic Constitution, attention must first be drawn to the caveats
formulated by the Venice Commission in the introduction to its opin-
ion: we are told not to expect an in-depth analysis of the entire text
submitted for scrutiny, but only "a technical-legal analysis.., on the
basis of the material provided," while at the same time bearing in
mind that "certain comments and omissions might be affected by
problems of the translation." The reasons for these provisos are two-
fold. The rapporteurs felt considerable time pressure, as they knew
that parliamentary elections were scheduled to take place in the
spring of 2013. This meant that if the current Althingi was to benefit
from their advice, the opinion had to be prepared expeditiously. In
addition, since none of the rapporteurs could read or speak Icelandic,
they had to rely on whatever documents were available in English;
and while the requesting parliamentary committee had produced a
46. Id. 181.
47. Id. 183.
48. The Althingi was dissolved in late March without the constitutional bill hav-
ing been put to a vote. It was instead agreed to alter the existing constitutional
amendment procedure, without necessarily making it easier to revise the constitu-
tion. This move has been strongly criticized as a betrayal of the public will by
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Putsch: Iceland's Crowd-Sourced Constitution Killed by Parlia-
ment, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/putsch-
icelands-crowd-sourced-constitution-killed-by-parliament-2; Thorvaldur Gylfason,
Democracy on Ice: A Post-mortem of the Icelandic Constitution, OPENDEMOCRACY
(June 19, 2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-itlthorvaldur-gyl
fason/democracy-on-ice-post-mortem-of-icelandic-constitution.
2015]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
translation of the text of the constitutional bill, only excerpts of the
explanatory notes were translated.4 9 While it was accordingly sensi-
ble for the Venice Commission to include the caveats just mentioned,
we should also realize that these negatively affect the value and ar-
guably also to some degree the legitimacy of the resulting opinion.
Notwithstanding the shortage of time, the Icelandic opinion re-
lied on a wide range of sources from which the rapporteurs derived
benchmarks for their substantive evaluation. As was to be expected,
the discussion of the proposed human rights provisions was in part
informed by the European Convention on Human Rights and related
case law. The approach adopted seems rather peculiar, however. The
case law of the Strasbourg Court is only mentioned concerning the
issue of when human life begins, even though the relevant judgments
do not identify the existence of common standards that must be fol-
lowed by all parties to the Convention. 50 At the same time, when
examining provisions on privacy protection and the media, the opin-
ion contents itself with merely raising several questions that the
Icelandic authorities may wish to reflect upon, thus ignoring-delib-
erately or otherwise-the rich jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court,
which provides useful indicia in relation to at least some of those
questions.5 1
In analyzing other aspects of the proposed Icelandic Constitu-
tion, the opinion draws on the Venice Commission's studies and
occasionally also on earlier opinions examining constitutional texts
adopted by other countries. For example, the prerequisites formu-
lated for the holding of referendums were endorsed for being in line
with the guidelines set out in the Code of Good Practice on Referen-
dums 52 and, in a similar vein, the rapporteurs encouraged the
Icelandic authorities to consider this Code "as a source of inspiration"
when drafting the necessary implementing legislation. In contrast,
relying on a 2010 report on judicial independence, 53 the Venice Com-
mission concluded that prosecutors require legal provisions drafted
49. As regards the proposed human rights provisions, this defect was partially
remedied through a memorandum prepared by a former member of Iceland's constitu-
tional council, which added to the range of translated excerpts and corrected several
translation errors in the initial sample.
50. See Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 107 82; Tysi4c v. Poland, 2007-
I Eur. Ct. H.R. 219, 247 107.
51. There is a wealth of case law on the protection of privacy and the role and
responsibilities of the media under the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 8, 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [here-
inafter ECHRI; see, e.g., DAVID HARRIS ET AL., HARRIS, O'BOYLE AND WARBRICK: LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS chs. 12, 14 (3d ed. 2014); ALASTAIR
MOWBRAY, CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS chs. 10, 12 (3d ed. 2012).
52. CE, Venice Comm'n, Code of Good Practice on Referendums, supra note 15.
53. CE, Venice Comm'n, Report on the Independence of the Judicial System-
Part 1: The Independence of Judges, Doc. CDL-AD(2010)004 (Mar. 12-13, 2010).
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with specific reference to their profession and that the draft Icelandic
articles premised on a unitary approach to safeguarding the indepen-
dence of both judges and prosecutors needed to be reconceived
accordingly. To illustrate the precedential value that the Commission
accords to its own opinions, we can point to a reference to the 2008
opinion on Finland's new constitution in support of the finding that it
is incongruous to have popular elections for the office of the president
while simultaneously granting the holder of this post only marginal
powers; 54 as another example, when discussing the Althingi's pro-
posed competence to approve changes "in the church organization,"
the rapporteurs cited the Commission's earlier opinion on the new
Hungarian law on freedom of religion and the status of churches 55 to
caution the Icelandic authorities that this phrase should not be read
as authorizing government interference in the internal organization
of churches.
Lastly, scattered throughout the opinion we also encounter cita-
tions of constitutional practices adopted in other countries
extraneous to the Venice Commission's previous opinions and reports
that are held up to the Icelandic authorities as worthy of emulation.
This occurs for instance in the recommendation to distinguish be-
tween the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of
discrimination, where the Finnish Constitution is praised as an ex-
ample of a modern text that does just that;56 likewise, there is
mention of the German, Italian, and French pre-1962 regimes for
presidential elections as a more suitable choice than direct popular
election in view of the envisaged role for the Icelandic president.5 7 At
the same time, there are instances where the position adopted by the
Venice Commission could have been helpfully substantiated by such
comparative references but was not. To give just one example, the
opinion is critical of the mechanism whereby the president's refusal
to confirm a law adopted by the Althingi triggers a plebiscite on that
legislation, because it considers that pitting parliament and the pres-
ident against one another may damage either of these institutions.
On two separate occasions, the opinion instead moots as preferable
alternatives the idea of giving the president the right to refer legisla-
tion to a judicial body for scrutiny or creating a presidential veto that
can be overridden by a qualified majority of parliamentarians. It
fails, however, to make any reference to Poland, France, Portugal, or
54. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 420/2007 on the Constitution of Finland, Doc.
CDL-AD(2008)010 (Mar. 14-15, 2008) 40-43.
55. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 664/2012 on Act CCVI of 2011 on the Right to
Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Legal Status of Churches, Denomina-
tions and Religious Communities of Hungary, Doc. CDL-AD(2012)004 (Mar. 16-17,
2012).
56. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 702/2013 on the Draft New Constitution of Ice-
land, supra note 44, T 9.
57. Id. $ 83.
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Hungary, where the president may refer legislation presented to him
for signature to the constitutional court for review 5 8-or, for that
matter, to the constitutional systems in place in the Czech Republic,
Italy, Estonia, or Finland, to name but a few, where the head of state
has the right to return legislation to parliament for reconsideration. 59
Including such direct references to foreign constitutional models
would have made it easier for the domestic authorities to understand
and heed the Venice Commission's counsel in refining their new con-
stitutional framework.
C. Tunisia: Establishing a Constitutional Democracy
In the wake of the Jasmine Revolution, which triggered the fall
of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, Tunisia em-
barked on the journey to radically overhaul its political system to
transition from repressive dictatorship to constitutional democracy.
As a first step, elections were held in 2011 to determine the composi-
tion of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly. This body,
which comprised Islamists, leftists, and liberals, was mandated to
draft a new constitution and appoint an interim government. Follow-
ing a complex and lengthy constitution-making process-with the
drafters conducting their work in a period of ongoing political and
social upheaval 6 0-the members of the Constituent Assembly agreed
on a final draft for a new Tunisian Constitution in the summer of
2013. The Assembly's speaker thereupon requested the Venice Com-
mission to provide its legal assessment of this text at the earliest
possibility, given the understandable urgency on the part of the Tuni-
sian authorities to bring what had been an arduous drafting process
to a successful conclusion. 61
The task of drawing up the opinion was given to an unusually
large working group of rapporteurs, made up of four professors of law
(Guido Neppi Modona from Italy, Jean-Claude Scholsem from
Belgium, Ben Vermeulen from the Netherlands, and Sergio Bartole
from Italy), two sitting and two former judges (Slavica Banid from
58. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION OF THE POLISH RE-
PUBLIC] art. 122(3) (1997); 1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.); CONSTITUI4 AO DA REPUBLICA
PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 278 (1976); MAGYAR-
ORSZAG ALAPTORVNYE [FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY] art. 6(5) (2011).
59. Ustavni zdkon 6. 1/993 Sb., Ustava 6eskd Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic] art. 50 (1992); Art. 74 Costituzione (It.); EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS
[CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA] art. 107 (1992); SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI
[FINNISH CONSTITUTION], 731/1999, art. 77 (1999).
60. See, e.g., Zaid A1-Ali & Donia Ben Romdhane, Tunisia's New Constitution:
Progress and Challenges to Come, ICONNECT BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.icon
nectblog.com/2014/02/tunisias-new-constitution-progress-and-challenges-to-come/.
61. In addition, the advisor to the Minister of Human Rights and Transitional
Justice asked the Venice Commission in April 2013 to analyze the country's pre-revo-
lutionary law concerning the Higher Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
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Croatia, Jean-Claude Colliard and Jacqueline de Guillenchmidt from
France, and Wilhelmina Thomassen from the Netherlands), an Irish
law reform commissioner (Finola Flanagan), and the former speaker
of the Maltese House of Representatives (Michael Frendo).62 The rap-
porteurs completed their assessment of the proposed Tunisian
Constitution in just over a month, and their draft opinion was en-
dorsed by the Plenary of the Venice Commission in the middle of
October 2013.63
The opinion was generally positive about the compatibility of the
draft Tunisian Constitution with democratic and fundamental rights
standards, although it did identify certain topics that the constitution
makers ought to attend to more closely. These included perceived in-
consistencies in the organization of the state/religion relationship
and the position of Islam and concerns about the scope of access to a
new constitutional court. A perusal of the final text reveals that the
Tunisian constitution makers heeded several, though not all, of the
Venice Commission's suggestions before approving their country's
new constitution in late January 2014.64
As could be expected, the fact that the Tunisian opinion was
drafted in a particularly short timeframe left its mark, in various
ways, on both the legal advice itself and the procedure that preceded
its adoption. For one, no country visit was scheduled and the Tuni-
sian authorities failed to make observations in response to the
rapporteurs' draft opinion. The significance of these departures from
Venice Commission procedural "normalcy" for a meaningful exchange
of views is, however, mitigated by the fact that the Venice Commis-
sion had been assisting the members of the National Constituent
Assembly in various ways since the outset of the Tunisian constitu-
tion-making process. 65 For instance, four exchanges of views on
drafts of the constitution and related quasi-constitutional legislation
took place in 2012 and in that same year, several deputies of the Con-
62. The working group further comprised an external expert from the Congress of
Local and Regional Authorities to assist with the analysis of the constitutional provi-
sions concerning decentralization.
63. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 733/2013 on the Final Draft Constitution of the
Republic of Tunisia, Doc. CDL-AD(2013)032 (Oct. 11-12, 2013).
64. For instance, the initial text allowed only the president to refer legislative
bills to the constitutional court for scrutiny. The Venice Commission considered this
too restrictive, favoring extending access to the opposition (id. 175-76)-which is
today provided for in Article 120 of the Tunisian Constitution (2014). Similarly, re-
strictions of fundamental rights must comply with the principle of proportionality
according to Article 49, a requirement that was inserted following a recommendation
to that effect by the Venice Commission (CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 733/2013 on
the Final Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, supra note 63, 42).
65. To be clear, the Venice Commission was not the only organization providing
constitutional assistance. Consider, e.g., WILBERFORCE SOC'Y, PROPOSED CONSTITU.
TIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA (Riddhi Dasgupta & George
Bangham chief eds., 2012), http://thewilberforcesociety.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2012/09/ProposedConstitutionalFrameworkfor..theRepublic ofTunisia5.pdf.
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stituent Assembly took part in a study mission to the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg and to two of Germany's highest
courts.66 It stands to reason that this continuous engagement over
the course of the drafting process reduced the need for extensive in-
formation gathering and feedback at the culmination of that process.
Time concerns also account for another deviation from routine
Venice Commission practice: the size of the group of rapporteurs and
their approach of dividing the work, with each rapporteur being re-
sponsible for evaluating only one or two chapters of the draft
Tunisian Constitution instead of the text in its entirety. This is not
the approach typically adopted-and for good reason, one might add,
as the risk of inconsistencies in the substantive analysis and of
missed opportunities for cross-reference looms large. In the specific
case of the Tunisian opinion, there is an apparent lack of homogene-
ity concerning the reliance placed on the various types of legal text
that supply the criteria for evaluating the merits of the draft consti-
tution. To illustrate, we can contrast the analysis of the provisions
governing constitutional revision with the discussion of the position
of the office of the president. The part of the opinion dealing with the
former topic is explicitly informed by a 2010 report on constitutional
amendment, 67 the Venice Commission's earlier opinion on amend-
ments to the Azerbaijan Constitution,68 and an exhaustive list of
countries whose foundational texts identify certain provisions and
principles as "unamendable." In contrast, in the section devoted to
the role of the president, not a single mention is made of previous
opinions, foreign constitutional models or practices, or international
texts. This is unsatisfactory, since the powers given to this office are
rightly characterized as "far from negligible" and there are several
European countries whose experience with the political difficulties
associated with a bifurcated executive would have been illuminating
for the Tunisian authorities (think for instance of France or the
Czech Republic).
More generally, when comparing the Tunisian opinion with those
examined in the other case studies, one is struck by the general
dearth of references to Venice Commission texts and foreign constitu-
tional models. This is problematic. As a rule, a solid empirical
grounding enhances the objectivity and authority of the resultant
opinion, and indirectly that of the authoring institution. In the case of
Tunisia, the opinion unfortunately fails to make optimal use of avail-
able Commission documents to do just that. To give an example, on
66. CE, Venice Comm'n, Annual Report of Activities 2012, Doc. CDL-
RA(2012)001, at 19, 46 (Aug. 2013).
67. CE, Venice Comm'n, Report on Constitutional Amendment, Doc. CDL-
AD(2010)001 (Dec. 11-12, 2009).
68. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 518/2008 on the Draft Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Doc. CDL-AD(2009)010 (Mar. 13-14, 2009).
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several occasions the role and powers of the opposition are singled
out as significant in establishing a well-functioning democracy with-
out, however, drawing attention to a 2010 Venice Commission report
that identifies several best practices as regards this topic. 69
In addition, we are here dealing with a country desiring to leave
behind its authoritarian past to become a modern constitutional de-
mocracy, so more guidance and an indication of sources that can
provide further inspiration to the drafters would have been apposite.
To illustrate: the opinion welcomes as "clear democratic progress" the
possibility for individuals to request that the court hearing their dis-
pute refer questions concerning the constitutionality of the applicable
legislation to a newly established constitutional court, but it recom-
mends the introduction of a filter mechanism for fear that the court
may otherwise be inundated by applications. 70 At this juncture, a
succinct discussion of the different regimes governing the admissibil-
ity of preliminary references in jurisdictions such as France,
Belgium, Italy, or Germany would have given lawmakers a better
idea of the various ways in which such a filter can be designed. 7 ' It is
similarly curious that the opinion here makes no mention of the 2010
Venice Commission report on individual access to constitutional jus-
tice, which contains a wealth of information regarding the
approaches taken by other member states concerning the ways in
which individuals have access to court to obtain constitutional
redress. 72
Following on from what has been said so far, the substantive
analysis presented in the Tunisian opinion is comparatively shallow.
Although almost every provision of the proposed constitution is cov-
ered, the opinion often limits itself to merely summarizing the
content of the various articles-presumably because the rapporteurs
felt these did not raise any questions from a democratic, fundamental
rights, or rule-of-law perspective. It would have been better, and un-
doubtedly more useful for the Tunisian drafters, if the rapporteurs
had opted for a more selective approach and devoted what limited
time they had to providing a thorough legal analysis of those issues
needing improvement in some form.
69. CE, Venice Comm'n, Report on the Role of the Opposition in a Democratic
Parliament, Doc. CDL-AD(2010)025-e (Oct. 15-16, 2010).
70. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 733/2013 on the Final Draft Constitution of the
Republic of Tunisia, supra note 63, 1 178-80.
71. For discussion, see, e.g., MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN Eu-
ROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYsIs 132-40, 383-84 (2014).
72. CE, Venice Comm'n, Study 538/2009 on Individual Access to Constitutional
Justice, Doc. CDL-AD(2010)039rev (Oct. 17-18, 2010).
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D. Belgium: Amending the Rules for Constitutional Amendment
In 2012, the Venice Commission adopted for the first time an
opinion in relation to the Belgian Constitution. 73 Unlike the previous
two case studies, the Commission was in this instance not asked to
provide an analysis of the entire text; instead, its involvement was
confined to reviewing proposed changes to the provision setting out
the constitutional revision procedure. These changes were intended
to overcome the political gridlock over reforms to bring about a fur-
ther federalization of the Belgian state74 that had resulted inter alia
in an extremely protracted coalition-building effort in the wake of the
2010 parliamentary elections. Relatedly, the amendment sought to
respond to a constitutional court decision holding that the rules gov-
erning the arrangements for federal elections in two of the country's
electoral districts breached the non-discrimination principle and up-
set the constitutional balance struck as regards political
representation. 75 A political agreement was finally reached in late
2011 that proved acceptable to the various political parties, including
two opposition parties. The implementation of this agreement, known
as the Sixth State Reform, 76 required changes to various constitu-
tional provisions, including those pertaining to the organization of
federal and European Parliament elections, the bicameral system,
and the range of competencies granted to the lower echelons of gov-
ernment. Amending the Belgian Constitution is no easy matter,
however. The relevant provision, Article 195, envisages a three-stage
process. First, both Houses of Parliament must initiate the revision
procedure by adopting a declaration specifying which articles are eli-
gible for amendment. This automatically triggers the second stage,
which consists of the dissolution of parliament and elections. It is for
the newly constituted Houses to, in the third stage, debate and adopt
73. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 679/2012 on the Revision of the Constitution of
Belgium, Doc. CDL-AD(2010)010 (June 15-16, 2012).
74. From its independence in 1830 until 1970, Belgium was a unitary, centralized
state. In the 1970s, a process of state reform was initiated-prompted inter alia by a
demand by Flemish-speaking Flanders for cultural autonomy and insistence by
French-speaking Wallonia on autonomy in matters of economic governance-under
which state powers have been allocated among three levels of government in an on-
going process of progressive federalization. See, e.g., 23 REGIONAL & FED. STUD.
(SPECIAL ISSUE: THE FUTURE OF BELGIAN FEDERALISM) (2013).
75. Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no 73/2003, May
26, 2003, http://www.const-court.be (Belg.).
76. Accord institutionnel pour la sixi6me r6forme de l'tat, intitul6 "Un ttat fed-
6ral plus efficace et des entites plus autonomes [Institutional Agreement on the 6th
State Reform, Entitled "A More Efficient Federal State and More Autonomous Enti-
ties"] (Brussels, Oct. 11, 2011). See, e.g., Min Reuchamps, The Current Challenges on
the Belgium Federalism and the Sixth Reform of the State, in THE WAYS OF FEDERAL-
ISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN SPAIN
375 (Alberto L6pez-Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013).
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the proposed changes by qualified majority. 7 The arduous nature of
this procedure would ordinarily have meant that the enactment of
the Sixth State Reform would be quite some time in the making, with
concomitant risks that future political sensibilities might throw a
spanner in the works. A creative solution was found: instead of apply-
ing the three-stage amendment process to the various constitutional
provisions that would need to be changed to give effect to the political
agreement, it was decided to amend the provision that outlines the
constitutional revision procedure itself. More concretely, a transi-
tional provision was to be inserted into Article 195 waiving the
requirement to dissolve parliament as regarded an exhaustive list of
changes to various constitutional articles that would together realize
the implementation of the Sixth State Reform. The appeal of this so-
lution stemmed from the fact that parliament in 2010 had adopted a
declaration listing, amongst others, Article 195 as open for amend-
ment-but not any of the articles that would be susceptible to
alteration under the newly proposed transitional provision-and this
declaration had been adopted prior to the elections held later that
year. This meant that the first two hurdles of the ordinary revision
process had already been cleared and that the current parliament
would be able to effect the necessary changes to Article 195 immedi-
ately, acting by qualified majority.
Members of one of the opposition parties, however, considered
that the envisaged amendment of Article 195 was not in conformity
with the letter and spirit of the Belgian Constitution and furthermore
was contrary to the rule of law.78 They decided to lodge a complaint to
this effect with the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Assembly
thereupon unanimously decided to forward the matter to the Venice
Commission for evaluation.
We are thus dealing with an instance where, unlike in the Ice-
landic and Tunisian case studies, the government in question did not
engage the Venice Commission. What is more, the Belgian govern-
ment actively sought to prevent the Commission from taking up the
matter: the Prime Minister sent a letter to the Parliamentary Assem-
bly's Bureau asking it not to transmit the complaint to the Venice
Commission and, when this did not yield the desired result, the gov-
ernment prepared a memorandum for the latter requesting it to
77. Both Houses of Parliament must adopt the amendment with a two-thirds ma-
jority, with the additional requirement that two-thirds of the members of parliament
must be present at the vote.
78. They further considered that the amendment would bring about the unlawful
suspension of the Belgian Constitution. See, e.g., Kamer Past Grondwetsartikel 195
Aan en Zet Eerste Stap naar Staatshervorming, KNACK.BE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://
www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/kamer-past-grondwetsartikel- 195-aan-en-zet-eerste-
stap-naar-staatshervormingarticle-normal-51705.html.
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"declare the complaint... with regard to Article 195 of the Belgian
Constitution unfounded." 79 The government's eagerness to avoid ex-
ternal scrutiny of the suggested constitutional change can be
explained by its apprehension that domestic political actors might
seize upon any critical remarks made by outside observers as an op-
portunity to reopen the debate on the carefully wrought institutional
agreement. Unsurprisingly, however, the Venice Commission did not
accede to the government's request and appointed three rapporteurs
to investigate the matter: Christoph Grabenwarter from Austria, Pe-
ter Paczolay from Hungary-both serving on their countries'
respective constitutional courts-and Anne Peters from Germany, a
professor of law. Their draft opinion was prepared without a country
visit being conducted and, while the rapporteurs were admittedly ap-
prised of the Belgian authorities' views through the unsolicited
memorandum, they were accordingly deprived of exposure to the
opinions of other stakeholders. This may have weakened their ability
to provide as objective an assessment of the issue as possible.
As it happens, the final opinion was by no means unfavorable to
the Belgian government. To start with, the Venice Commission was
solicitous of the political predicament of the national authorities,
clearly evident in several references to the rationale for the amend-
ment under review.80 The few critical notes that it sounds are
moreover couched in decidedly mild language. While a greater degree
of transparency as to the content and implications of the declaration
initiating the constitutional revision process would have been "prefer-
able" and "suitable,"81 it wrote, the severity of this shortcoming was
considered to have been alleviated by the fact that "some indications
were given about possible amendments . . . going beyond the list
adopted [in the 2010 declaration]."82 Similarly, although a "longer
formal procedure could have been envisaged in order to ensure proper
debate"8 3 on the amendment, the opinion quickly goes on to note that
the pertinent substantive issues "had been discussed for a long time
in other forums and outside the formal parliamentary procedure."8 4
The reticence on the part of the Venice Commission to create
problems for the Belgian authorities was furthermore aided by the
79. Belgian Gov't, Memorandum for the Attention of the Venice Commission, Doc.
CDL-REF(2012)019 (May 16, 2012), at 4.
80. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 679/2012 on the Revision of the Constitution of
Belgium, supra note 73, e.g., 4, 72.
81. Id. 73.
82. Id. 54.
83. Id. 73. As the draft opinion recounts (CE, Venice Comm'n, Draft Opinion on
the Revision of the Constitution of Belgium, Doc. CDL(2012)31* (June 1, 2012) 55),
the procedure "lasted no longer than six days [with] a five hours long debate in the
parliament before the final vote." This sentence does not appear in the final text of the
opinion as adopted by the Plenary.
84. Id.
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absence of firm common standards in relation to constitutional
amendments. In their draft opinion, the rapporteurs relied heavily on
the findings of a 2009 Commission study, which provided an overview
of the rules for constitutional revision in force in the Council of Eu-
rope's member states and several other jurisdictions.8 5 While
purposely including observations amenable to "future assessments of
the existing or draft rules on constitutional amendment," the aim of
the 2009 study had not been to articulate best practices, let alone
identify shared standards governing formal constitutional change, as
that was considered to be "neither possible nor desirable." In assess-
ing the merits of the Belgian revision procedure, the rapporteurs
could thus with little difficulty conclude that this procedure was com-
fortably "within the corridor of diverse European approaches to this
balancing exercise and do[es] not overstep the limits of legitimate le-
gal solutions."8 6 The Plenary Session of the Venice Commission
endorsed their findings in mid-June 2012.87 There was accordingly
no need for the Belgian authorities to take any remedial action,
which was just as well, given that the amendment in question had
already entered into force by that time.
E. Hungary: Replacing the Constitution of Communist Vintage
Following the fall of communism in Hungary at the end of the
1980s, the country's "negotiated revolution"88 to democracy took the
form of a series of comprehensive amendments to the country's preex-
isting 1949 Stalinist constitution.8 9 While plans to adopt a new
foundational text were mooted at several occasions during the de-
cades that followed, these never came to fruition, given the absence of
parliamentary consensus. This changed following the 2010 parlia-
mentary elections, which saw the Fidesz Party's ascent to power.
85. CE, Venice Comm'n, Report on Constitutional Amendment, supra note 67.
86. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 679/2012 on the Revision of the Constitution of
Belgium, supra note 73, 51. In fact, the rapporteurs seemed more concerned with
the stringency of the normal amendment procedure than with its temporary relaxa-
tion. Regarding the former, they noted that while parliamentary consent in two
consecutive legislative periods may enhance the democratic legitimacy of constitu-
tional amendments, "it may in many situations turn out to be a severe impediment to
sometimes urgent reforms and/or necessary fundamental reforms of the state" (id.
19). Conversely, the temporary procedure is explicitly stated to be in line with the
approach adopted by most other European constitutions, with a greater degree of en-
trenchment considered to be the exception, not the rule and certainly not "a European
standard" (id. 58).
87. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 679/2012 on the Revision of the Constitution of
Belgium, supra note 73, 71.
88. Ldszl6 Bruszt, 1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary, in POST-COMMU-
NIST TRANSITION: EMERGING PLURALISM IN HUNGARY 30 (Andrds Boz6ki et al. eds.,
1992).
89. For fuller discussion, see Andrew Arato & Zoltdn Mikl6si, Constitution Mak-
ing and Transitional Politics in Hungary, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF
TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 350 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010).
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After a flurry of constitutional amendments-including one that
curbed the jurisdiction of the constitutional court to review budget
and tax legislation-the Fidesz Party announced plans to replace the
existing constitution with a completely new document. An ad-hoc
parliamentary constitution-drafting committee and a body of na-
tional consultation were accordingly appointed in late 2010. In
February of the following year, the Hungarian authorities turned to
the Venice Commission for advice-not seeking its views on the mer-
its of the draft text, but instead asking for guidance on three specific
legal issues faced by the Hungarian drafters.90 This task was en-
trusted to three law professors (Hanna Suchocka from Poland, Kaarlo
Tuori from Finland, and Jan Velaers from Belgium), one sitting and
one retired constitutional justice (Christoph Grabenwarter from Aus-
tria and Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem from Germany, respectively).
Shortly after receiving their mandate, the rapporteurs travelled to
Hungary for an exchange of views with affected political actors and
representatives of civil society. The opinion, which was eventually
adopted by the Plenary in late March 2011,91 emphatically main-
tained that it should not be treated as providing an analysis of
substantive constitutional provisions-not least because the Venice
Commission received the proposed text of the new Hungarian Consti-
tution only after the rapporteurs had concluded their work. That
said, the Commission did not content itself with providing the domes-
tic authorities the requested guidance. It also used the opportunity to
make abundantly clear its concern about the amendment circum-
scribing the scope for constitutional adjudication as well as the
manner in which the constitution-making process was being con-
ducted, noting
the lack of transparency of the process and the distribution
of a public draft of the new Constitution only on 14 March
2011, a few weeks before its planned adoption, shortcomings
in the dialogue between the majority and the opposition, the
insufficient opportunities for an adequate public debate
on such a fundamental process, and its very limited
timeframe.92
90. Namely, whether to enshrine the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights in the constitution; who should be able to request the constitutional court to
conduct a priori reviews of bills and the effects of constitutional rulings in this con-
text; and finally, whether the European constitutional heritage would permit the
introduction of conditions restricting individuals' direct access to the constitutional
court.
91. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 614/2011 on Three Legal Questions Arising in
the Process of Drafting the New Constitution of Hungary, Doc. CDL-AD(2011)001
(Mar. 25-26, 2011).
92. Id. at 13.
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On several occasions, the opinion accordingly exhorted the Hun-
garian authorities to ensure that so-called core democratic standards
such as transparency and pluralistic debates were adhered to.
The Venice Commission's involvement in Hungary's constitu-
tional transformation would not be confined to this episode, however.
After the final draft of what is today officially known as Hungary's
Fundamental Law93 was placed before that country's parliament for
adoption, it was the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope that-as it had done in the Belgian case study-asked the
Venice Commission to review this text.94 Moreover, when Hungary in
later months adopted a string of laws fleshing out various constitu-
tional provisions as well as several amendments to the new
Fundamental Law, a number of these were also referred to the Ven-
ice Commission for assessment-sporadically at the request of the
Hungarian government, 95 but more commonly by other organs of the
Council of Europe.96 Thus, differently from the Tunisian experience,
we see that the promulgation of the new Hungarian Constitution was
in effect the trigger for, rather than the culmination of, the Venice
Commission's ongoing engagement with Hungary's reform process.
It should be mentioned that the developments in Hungary did
not only attract the attention of Council of Europe bodies; several Eu-
ropean Union (EU) institutions also expressed their disquiet about
the perceived backsliding of one of their member states in upholding
classic constitutional values. In 2011, the European Commission in-
dicated that it would "closely monitor developments related to
Hungary's new constitution following a number of concerns expressed
by the Council of Europe, Members of the European Parliament and
others."97 This gave rise, inter alia, to an ongoing dialogue between
the Commission and the Hungarian authorities about the compatibil-
93. For a comprehensive analysis, see, e.g., CONSTITUTION FOR A DISUNITED NA-
TION: ON HUNGARY'S 2011 FUNDAMENTAL LAw (Gdbor Attila T6th ed., 2012); Andras
Jakab & Pal Sonnevend, Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hun-
gary, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 102 (2013).
94. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 621/2011 on the New Constitution of Hungary,
Doc. CDL-AD(2011)016 (June 17-18, 2011).
95. E.g., CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 662/2012 on Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elec-
tions of Members of Parliament of Hungary, Doc. CDL-AD(2012)012 (June 15-16,
2012); CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 664/2012 on Act CCVI of 2011 on the Right to
Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Legal Status of Churches, Denomina-
tions and Religious Communities of Hungary, supra note 55.
96. E.g., CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 665/2012 on Act CLI of 2011 on the Consti-
tutional Court of Hungary, Doc. CDL-AD(2012)009 (June 15-16, 2012); CE, Venice
Comm'n, Opinion 668/2012 on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service and Act
CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors and Other Prose-
cution Employees and the Prosecution Career, Doc. CDL-AD(2012)008 (June 15-16,
2012); CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 671/2012 on the Act on the Rights of Nationali-
ties of Hungary, Doc. CDL-AD(2012)011 (June 15-16, 2012).
97. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, European Commission Launches Accelerated In-
fringement Proceedings Against Hungary over the Independence of Its Central Bank
and Data Protection Authorities as well as over Measures Affecting the Judiciary
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ity with EU law of several new laws and changes to existing
legislation adopted pursuant to the implementation of the Funda-
mental Law.98 The Commission eventually took Hungary to the
Court of Justice of the European Union over the lack of independence
of its data protection authority and the status of the judiciary.9 9 For
its part, the European Parliament contemplated activating the proce-
dure laid down in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU),1° ° which can result in the suspension of a member state's
rights under EU law in the event of (risks of) serious encroachments
upon the Union's foundational values-including democracy, the rule
of law, and respect for human rights. Such a move was, however, po-
litically unpalatable for the Council, which comprises representatives
of the member states and holds decision-making power in the context
of Article 7. The "Hungarian problem" threw into sharp relief the in-
adequacy of the current EU framework to take action when there is a
legitimate fear that changes to a member state's constitutional order
may not sit comfortably with the Union's foundational values. This
has prompted serious reflection on the part of the Union's political
institutions to develop a more sophisticated set of legal tools to en-
force the member states' commitment to these common values,' 0 '
with the European Commission in early 2014 proposing a new EU
Rule of Law Framework to this end. 10 2
Returning to the Venice Commission's opinion on Hungary's
Fundamental Law, the initial examination of this text was sensibly
entrusted to the same rapporteurs who had prepared the earlier ad-
vice, and they partook in another two-day country visit to collect
further observations from various stakeholders in the spring of 2011.
(Jan. 17, 2012) (IP/12/24), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-
24_en.htm.
98. See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Statement of the European Commis-
sion on the Situation in Hungary on 11 January 2012 (Jan. 11, 2012) (MEMO/12/9),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-12-9_en.htm.
99. Case C-286/12, Comm'n v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687. On this case, see
Uladzislau Belavusau, On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead Dogs, 50 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1145 (2013); Case C-288/12 Comm'n v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.
The European Commission lacks the authority to initiate infringement proceedings
directed at (provisions in) a country's constitution if no clear link with the EU can be
established.
100. Resolution of 16 February 2012 on the Recent Political Developments in Hun-
gary, EUR. PARL. Doc. P7_TA(2012)0053 (2012) § 7; Treaty on European Union art.
100, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 (last consolidated Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter TEU].
101. See, e.g., Jos6 Manuel Barroso, President, European Comm'n, State of the
Union 2012 Address (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm; Press Release, Council of the European Union, 3244th
Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs (June 6-7, 2013), Doc. 10461/13, at 14(Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law-Council Conclusions), available at http:/!
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/enjha/137407.pdf.
102. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM (2014)158 final/2
(Mar. 19, 2014).
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They rightly refrained from striving to be comprehensive in their ex-
amination, thus avoiding the trap that the Tunisian working group
fell into. The rapporteurs' choice to provide "substantial insights with
regard to some selected points" partially accounts for the overall criti-
cal tone of the opinion. While the Venice Commission welcomed
Hungary's efforts to draft a constitution in line with the Council of
Europe's bedrock values of democracy, the rule of law, and the protec-
tion of fundamental rights, it expressed unease about a range of
constitutional issues. Prominent among these is the very extensive
use of organic legislation to regulate a multitude of societal matters
in considerable detail, requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament
instead of the simple majority needed to pass ordinary legislation.
The Venice Commission's concern here was twofold. In some do-
mains, such as the functioning of the regular judiciary and the
system for fundamental rights protection, the constitution itself
ought to be more specific, instead of leaving it to organic laws (re-
ferred to as "cardinal laws" in the Hungarian Fundamental Law) to
flesh out essential guarantees. Conversely, requiring relatively mun-
dane matters such as family or social and taxation policy to be dealt
with in organic legislation may detract from the future relevance of
elections, as it will be more difficult for a new legislature to change
policies put in place by its predecessors due to the high voting thresh-
old, something that may ultimately jeopardize "the principle of
democracy itself."10 3 At the same time, in a valiant effort to keep
open the channels of communication, the Venice Commission noted
that some of its concerns could be addressed during the subsequent
adoption of legislation enacted to give further effect to the Funda-
mental Law and said that it "[stood] ready to assist the Hungarian
authorities in this process upon their request"-an offer that, as we
have seen, has sporadically been accepted.' 0 4
Given the opinion's critical tone, it is only proper that the rap-
porteurs made every effort to bolster their analysis with ample
references to Council of Europe and Venice Commission texts (both
reports and earlier opinions) and foreign constitutional models,
thereby making it the most cogent and articulate of all the opinions
canvassed in this article. Particularly noteworthy are the frequent
citations of the ECHR and Strasbourg case law, including when the
opinion acknowledges that this case law does not as yet lay down
binding standards-for instance, as regards the legal recognition of
same-sex relationships. While those references might therefore be
considered premature, the better view is to appreciate that by includ-
ing them, the Venice Commission alerts the Hungarian authorities to
103. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 62112011 on the New Constitution of Hungary,
supra note 94, T 24.
104. Id. 150.
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the fact that the body of common standards is evolving and ex-
panding; and that keeping abreast of ECHR developments when
interpreting and applying their new Fundamental Law will be in-
strumental in avoiding possible future convictions in Strasbourg.
Seen in this light and more generally, the Hungarian opinion clearly
showcases the Venice Commission's broad understanding of its man-
date: ensuring the conformity of both a country's constitution and its
operationalization with transnational constitutional standards.
The rapporteurs should also be commended for endeavoring to
take due account of the local Hungarian context-in marked contrast
to the purely "technical-legal analysis" provided in the Icelandic opin-
ion and the rather superficial evaluation contained in the Tunisian
advice. In its opening sections, the second Hungarian opinion notes
that the Hungarian Constitution "contains a number of particular
variations of European guarantees ... [most of which] are linked to
national traditions and identity."' 0 5 At the same time, the Venice
Commission is reluctant to allow appeals to national identity to serve
to immunize constitutional arrangements from its scrutiny: "while a
number of these special guarantees may be seen as part of national
constitutional autonomy, other guarantees must be analysed in the
light of European standards. 10 6 This is most apparent in its critical
evaluation of the reliance on organic legislation to further flesh out
the Hungarian Fundamental Law. While acknowledging that reli-
ance on such legislation had long been a part of the Hungarian
constitutional tradition and that several other countries also make
use of organic laws, the Venice Commission nevertheless found-as
we saw earlier-that the Fundamental Law envisages too extensive a
use of organic legislation, which is liable to compromise the principle
of democracy. It should be clear that the Venice Commission's ap-
proach to scrutinizing elements pertaining to a country's national
identity is sound in principle; its role and influence would be compro-
mised if it were to systematically exempt such features from a check
for compatibility with common standards, when these exist. This
holds in particular in situations where the request for an opinion
does not emanate from the national authorities in question, who may
have their own reasons for keeping domestic constitutional arrange-
ments away from prying eyes. It does however bring to the fore a
fundamental question relevant not only for the Venice Commission,
but also for other non-national entities evaluating domestic constitu-
tional reforms: how much scope should be allowed for national
particularities? This issue will be explored in greater detail in Part
III.B below, focusing specifically on the scope ratione materiae and
105. Id. 19.
106. Id.
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detail of the transnational standards used by the Venice Commission
in its opinions.
III. EVALUATING THE VENICE COMMISSION'S PERFORMANCE IN
PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE
The above case studies illustrate the manner in which the Venice
Commission goes about advising constitution-making societies. It is
important to recognize that its opinions lack binding force. Yet, incen-
tives other than legal enforceability buttress the de facto
effectiveness of Commission opinions. These include the threat of
moral disapprobation by other states or, formulated in more positive
terms, the desire on the part of the country requesting constitutional
guidance to be seen as a proper member of the international commu-
nity of democracies committed to the rule of law and fundamental
rights. 10 7 Furthermore, other organizations that do possess the
power to compel state action may rely on the suggestions for improve-
ment and criticisms of envisaged constitutional reforms identified by
the Venice Commission in the exercise of that power. At present, this
applies most notably to the European Union.'0 8 The European Com-
mission regularly refers to Venice Commission opinions when
assessing whether candidates for accession to the EU meet the politi-
cal prerequisites for membership. 10 9 In addition, in the Hungarian
saga discussed earlier, the Commission and the European
Parliament relied on the Venice Commission's opinions concerning
Hungary's new Fundamental Law, amendments thereto, and quasi-
constitutional laws. A press release by the Commission states that
there is an expectation that "the Hungarian authorities will take due
account of [the Venice Commission's opinion on the fourth amend-
ment to the Fundamental Law] and address it in full accordance with
both European Union and Council of Europe principles, rules and
values.""10 Even more forceful is the Parliament's resolution, which
"[ulrges the Hungarian authorities to . . .implement as swiftly as
possible the following recommendations, in line with the recommen-
dations of the Venice Commission, with a view to fully complying
107. Cf Hoffinann-Riem, supra note 17, at 591.
108. Other Council of Europe bodies-such as the Parliamentary Assembly and
the European Court of Human Rights-also take note of and use Venice Commission
opinions in the course of their activities.
109. See, e.g., Eur. Comm'n, Commission Staff Working Document: Montenegro
2013 Progress Report, at 5, 36, SWD (2013) 411 final (Oct. 16, 2013). The conditions
for membership are laid down in Articles 2 and 49 of the TEU, supra note 100.
110. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, The European Commission Reiterates Its Seri-
ous Concerns over the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of Hungary (Apr. 12,
2013) (IP/13/327), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-13-327_en.
htm.
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with the rule of law and its key requirements."""' As the Venice Com-
mission's reputation continues to flourish and its membership and
activities expand beyond Europe's shores, it cannot be excluded that
in the future other organizations that take an interest in national
constitution-making processes will be similarly inclined to consider
its opinions as a source of empirical or even normative guidance. 112
As such, although the Venice Commission insists that its opin-
ions are intended to be suggestive rather than prescriptive, this view
may not always correspond to what happens in reality. This makes
concerns about the manner in which it goes about providing constitu-
tional advice salient. Amongst other things, there is at present no
comprehensive procedural framework regulating the exercise of this
task (Subpart A); the identification and articulation of the standards
that the Venice Commission uses would benefit from a greater degree
of sophistication (Subpart B); and it ought to seriously reflect on the
implications of its rapid expansion in membership, especially the par-
ticipation of non-European states, for its work (Subpart C).
A. More Detail in Procedural Guarantees
Some ten years ago, a former vice-president of the Venice Com-
mission observed that there is "no formalism in the procedures"
("aucun formalisme dans les procedures").1 13 His comment continues
to ring true today: there is still a dearth of regulations addressing the
Commission's working method. This state of affairs has not come
about by accident. At its inception in 1990, there was a keenly per-
ceived need for procedural flexibility in order to mold the working
method to suit the requirements of the particular country requesting
advice. Some three decades on, however, a strong argument can be
made that the merits of this initial attitude are outweighed by a com-
bination of reasons that militate in favor of a comprehensive
procedural framework to govern the Commission's functioning. Put
differently, the scarcity of procedural regulations is no longer prop-
erly considered as one of the strengths of the Commission's working
method, but better conceived as a weakness in want of remedial ac-
tion. Normative as well as practical reasons can be advanced in
support of this view.
111. Resolution on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices
in Hungary, EuR. PARL. Doc. A7-0229/2013 at 72 (2013).
112. This might for instance include the UN. See U.N. Secretary-General, Gui-
dance Note on United Nations Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes (Apr.
2009) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note].
113. Jacques Robert, L'ingdnierie constitutionnelle et l'Europe de l'est :Le role de la
Commission europdenne pour la ddmocratie par le droit, in LA REINVENTION DE L'9TAT :
DgMOCRATIE POLITIQUE ET ORDRE JURIDIQUE EN EUROPE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE 97
(Slobodan Milacic ed., 2003).
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An ad hoc approach to procedural matters is no longer appropri-
ate for an advisory institution that has matured from a fledging body
seeking to demonstrate its value to post-Communist constitution-
making societies to one that possesses a solid reputation in the con-
stitutional domain and a not-insignificant degree of soft power. In
this context, the reflections contained in the 2009 Guidance Note by
the Secretary General on UN Assistance to Constitution-Making
Processes apply with equal, if not more, force to the Venice Commis-
sion: "Often, the UN system has employed ad hoc approaches, leading
to mixed results. A pressing need exists for the UN to develop strate-
gic guidance on how to support national actors during the design and
implementation of a constitution-making exercise."1 14
As a matter of fact, there already exists some kind of "strategic
guidance" in the case of the Venice Commission, in the form of a rela-
tively settled sequence of steps that are ordinarily taken prior to the
Plenary's adoption of an opinion. That the Commission acknowledges
as much can be deduced from the stylized account of these stages
presented on its website and in its annual reports. It is thus emi-
nently feasible to-at the very minimum-elevate what are currently
conventions to the status of legal regulation. A codification of basic
features of the procedure followed when dispensing constitutional ad-
vice is, moreover, tactically useful. We have seen that the Venice
Commission has aspirations to expand its status and activities be-
yond European shores. Having a solid, easily accessible procedural
framework enables both prospective members and international or-
ganizations with which the Commission collaborates or is eager to do
so-such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe"15-to become better acquainted with this
body and how it goes about its work. From the perspective of its cur-
rent members, finally, a change in approach would benefit the
Commission's credibility. One of the principles valued as an impor-
tant component of the rule of law is that of legal certainty." 6 The
Commission also attributes significance to transparency in its opin-
ions, as we for instance saw in the Belgian and Hungarian case
studies. A more elaborate and easily accessible set of procedural
guarantees would accordingly signal to the countries requesting its
assistance that the Commission practices what it preaches.
So what should be done? A more elaborate set of procedural guar-
antees is most urgently called for in relation to the participation of
the country whose constitutional system is the subject of an opinion
and the composition of the working group tasked with preparing the
114. U.N. Secretary General, Guidance Note, supra note 112, at 3.
115. See, e.g., CE, Venice Comm'n, Annual Report of Activities 2013, Doc. CDL-
RA(2013)001-e, at 78-79.
116. See, e.g., CE, Venice Comm'n, Report on the Rule of Law, Doc. CDL-
AD(2011)003 rev (Mar. 25-26, 2011).
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draft opinion. These two issues have the potential to shape the em-
phasis and quality of the Commission's advice and, as will become
clear, the relevant rules can be cast so as to facilitate the take-up of
its suggestions for reform.
As to the first issue, the Venice Commission claims on its website
and in its annual reports that it is ordinary practice for the rap-
porteurs to travel to the country concerned. Yet, this-non-binding-
proclamation is not always heeded. We have seen in Part II that fact-
finding missions do not always take place. Earlier, a Commission
member conceded:
Perhaps the Venice Commission might have given the im-
pression that sometimes its opinions were not really rooted
in a complete knowledge of the actual situation of the coun-
try dealt with, but it is well known that the Commission is
frequently called upon to give advice without having the
chance of incorporating data from fact-finding missions.
117
This, quite obviously, is undesirable. In order to provide a country
with constitutional guidance that is tailored to its specific domestic
conditions-and hence useful-a solid information base is impera-
tive. This is all the more so given that the group of rapporteurs
typically does not include persons with the nationality of the state
concerned that may be presumed to possess "complete knowledge of
the actual situation." The importance of acquiring sufficient factual
knowledge about the situation at hand before proceeding to make rec-
ommendations or assess how a country has fared is more generally
acknowledged under international law; think for instance of interna-
tional treaty bodies tasked with monitoring compliance with core
human rights conventions that make use of, inter alia, fact-finding
missions and scrutinizing states' reports in the exercise of their
mandate.118
As such, the Venice Commission's Rules of Procedure should be
amended to explicitly provide that the domestic authorities are to be
given the opportunity to explain their position and that a country
visit normally should be organized precisely for this purpose. It can of
course happen that a country's particular circumstances prevent a
fact-finding mission from taking place, for example due to time con-
straints as in the Belgian case study. In such an event, the Venice
Commission ought to be more discriminating than it has hitherto
been in deciding whether it will nevertheless accept the request for
constitutional assistance. While its zeal to support constitution-mak-
117. Bartole, supra note 12, at 363.
118. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/251, Human Rights Council, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/60/49 at % 5(e) (Mar. 15, 2006); Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
[hereinafter CEDAW] and CEDAW R. P. 48, 50, 76-88.
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ing societies is commendable, it should avoid situations where its
opinion-which will necessarily contain a more superficial analysis
in such cases-is sought and treated primarily as a sort of rubber-
stamp, or where there is a concomitantly greater likelihood that the
domestic authorities may not follow the Commission's recommenda-
tions. Either scenario might unnecessarily cause the Commission's
reputation to be dented.
The new provision on participation should further stipulate that
the national authorities are to be able to comment on the rapporteurs'
draft opinion. At present, the Venice Commission decides whether an
exchange of views at that juncture is "necessary."' 19 Clearly, even
after a country visit (and particularly in the absence of such a visit),
the rapporteurs may have formulated suggestions based on an inad-
vertent misunderstanding of the country's constitutional framework,
or there may have been intervening events that, if known, would
shape the nature and content of the Commission's recommendations.
Again, granting the domestic authorities a right of response enhances
the prospect that the final opinion will be received positively. 120 Do-
ing so is, furthermore, in line with one of the classic rules of natural
justice, viz. the principle of audi alteram partem. Ensuring respect
for this maxim is unlikely to add to the resource-intensity of the Com-
mission's work in the constitution-making domain and any risk of
unduly lengthening the procedure can be accommodated by requiring
states to exercise their right of reply within a specific time period.
The second issue that warrants explicit regulation in the Venice
Commission's Rules of Procedure concerns the makeup of the group
of rapporteurs in charge of preparing a draft opinion on the constitu-
tional arrangements under review. The latest amendments to the
Commission's Rules of Procedure have clarified that it is the Presi-
dent of the Commission who selects the rapporteurs. 12 ' As a matter
of law, he has complete discretion in the exercise of this power.122 A
look at the current practice reveals the presence of several "repeat
players," i.e., individual Commission members who are appointed as
rapporteur on a semi-regular basis and who predominantly or even
119. For a presentation of the steps involved in preparing an opinion, see The Com-
mission's Activities, CoUNcIL OF EUROPE/VENICE COMMISSION, http://www.venice.coe.
int/WebForms/pages/?p=0l-activities.
120. Cf. the Venice Commission's self-description of engaging in a "non-directive
dialogue" with the national authorities on the web page The Commission's Activities,
supra note 119; see also Giorgio Malinverni, The Contribution of the European Com-
mission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), in THE PREVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 128 (Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas & Linos-Alexander
Sicilianos eds., 2001).
121. CE, Venice Comm'n, Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 14(1).
122. As a matter of fact, however, his choice will be constrained by the rapporteurs'
availability on account of their principal professional commitments.
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only have a legal background. 123 This carries with it certain risks. To
be sure, a heavy reliance on certain persons as rapporteurs enables
these individuals to develop knowledge and capability in providing
constitutional guidance, which may benefit the quality of the result-
ing opinion. Yet, it also renders the system as a whole vulnerable
whenever such Commission members retire; recall, as well, that it is
for each state to decide whom to appoint and whether (and if so, how
frequently) to renew existing appointments, without any possibility
for other states, let alone the Commission itself, to influence these
decisions. 124 To borrow organizational management patois, there is a
need to guard against the loss of institutional knowledge. This can be
done, for instance, by stipulating that the President should, to the
extent possible, rotate rapporteur appointments among the entire in-
dividual membership of the Commission, and/or by putting in place
tools to equip each Commission member with core knowledge regard-
ing the provision of constitutional guidance. 125
More importantly, the sensibleness of having only rapporteurs
with predominantly or exclusively legal qualifications can be ques-
tioned, given that constitutions are more than just a body of formal
rules that occupy a privileged position within the domestic hierarchy
of legal norms. It has been said that they are "likely to reflect and
express distinct markers of national identity"1 26 and that "[a] coun-
try's cultural and political traditions shape the nature and
development of constitutionalism-the site where 'national history,
custom, religion, social values and assumptions about government
meet positive law.""' 27 We see this reflected in the composition of con-
stitutional courts, several of which have individuals with prior
political experience on the bench in recognition of the fact that inter-
preting and upholding the constitution requires more than only legal
skills or knowledge. ' 28 Indeed, the Venice Commission itself has indi-
cated that it aspires to situate opinions as much as possible in the
123. For instance, in the four case studies examined in Part II, four rapporteurs
were involved in more than one opinion, i.e., Jean-Claude Scholsem, Jacqueline de
Guillenchmidt, Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, and Christoph Grabenwarter.
124. Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 2(3); CE, Venice Comm'n, Revised
Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 1.
125. This could for instance take the form of a handbook or the organization of
training sessions led by experienced rapporteurs.
126. VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 3
(2010).
127. WEN-CHEN CHANG, LI-ANN Tim, KEVIN Y.L. TAN & JIUNN-RONG YEH, CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS 70 (2014) (citing Lawrence W. Beer,
Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 2 (Law-
rence W. Beer ed., 1992)).
128. See, e.g., Bijzondere wet op het Grondwettelijk Hof [Special Act on the Consti-
tutional Court] of Jan. 6, 1989, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, art. 34(2); DE VISSER, supra note 71, at 211-17.
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wider constitutional context of the country in question. 129 More spe-
cifically, the Commission has been known to reject institutional
arrangements in place in mature constitutional orders as being inap-
propriate for younger democracies, with the argument that the latter
lack the legal tradition that would allow such designs to work in a
satisfactory manner.130 For such assessments to be accurately made,
knowledge of the country's legal framework must be complemented
by a good understanding of its constitutional and political culture.
To address this issue, article 14 of the Rules of Procedure (gov-
erning the appointment of rapporteurs) should be amended to include
a sentence to the effect that each working group normally should
comprise at least one member with a background in political science.
To be fair, the implementation of such a provision is dependent on the
choices made by states in deciding on appointments to the Commis-
sion. Although the Statute in its current version mentions "the
contribution to the enhancement of law and political science" as one
of the criteria to be considered in this respect,' 3 1 those last two words
have had a minimal impact to date. Changing the status quo can be
encouraged by a modification of the Statute's wording. As an exam-
ple, Article 28(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) prescribes that the Committee responsible for moni-
toring states' compliance with the Convention "shall be composed of
... persons .. .[with] recognized competence in the field of human
rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation
of some persons having legal experience.' 3 2 For the Venice Commis-
sion's Statute, a phrase akin to the italicized words-whereby "legal"
would be replaced by "political science" or "non-legal"-could help-
fully alert member states to the importance of having renowned
experts with qualifications in domains other than law on this body.
When, notwithstanding the implementation of the changes just out-
lined, it so happens that there is no Commission member with
political science expertise available for appointment as rapporteur in
a given case, the President should consider inviting an outside con-
sultant to participate. In fact, this possibility has been countenanced
by the Statute from the beginning13 3-although it has been used only
sporadically-and there is no good reason why it should not also be
explicitly mentioned in the Rules of Procedure.
129. See, e.g., CE, Venice Comm'n, Annual Report of Activities 2013, supra note
115, at 86.
130. See Bartole, supra note 12, at 362; Diirr, supra note 5, at 158.
131. Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 2(1).
132. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPRI (emphasis added). See also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 17, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
133. Venice Comm'n Statute, supra note 11, art. 5.
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Finally, the Rules of Procedure should also clarify whether the
country on the receiving end of the Commission's opinion can give
some input concerning the appointment of rapporteurs. One may
readily imagine that a state may wish to request that a particular
individual be selected as rapporteur; for instance, because of his or
her experience with the constitutional structures contemplated for
introduction or due to familiarity with the country's legal tradi-
tion.134 Conversely, a country may have objections to a certain
Commission member-given that states can appoint current political
officeholders or civil servants to the Venice Commission, 135 a country
going through a political transition may, for example, not be keen on
such individuals serving as rapporteurs. The question whether states
should be able to exert some influence on the composition of the panel
tasked with advising them or judging their conduct has been faced by
other international bodies, both judicial and extrajudicial in charac-
ter. Some, such as the European Court of Human Rights-a fellow
Council of Europe organ-provide that the member elected in respect
of the state concerned shall sit on the bench ex officio in cases involv-
ing that state. 136 For others, the relevant rules stipulate in more
generic terms that the members should be acceptable to the states
concerned.' 37 The decision to grant countries a limited power to
shape the panel's configuration can be justified as making the out-
come more palatable for the domestic authorities. It would
accordingly seem opportune to include a similar possibility in the
Venice Commission's Rules of Procedure. The relevant provision
could give the state concerned the right to suggest or object to specific
rapporteurs, with the President being under an obligation to take
such observations into account when making his decision as to the
choice of working group members. In a codification of standing prac-
tice, it would additionally be prudent to stipulate that Commission
members appointed by the state concerned cannot serve as rap-
porteur when their country's constitutional arrangements are being
examined. Drafting the provision along these lines will safeguard the
Commission's cherished reputation as an objective expert body in
constitutional matters and protect the independence of its individual
members.138
134. For instance, the Icelandic bill for a new constitution drew upon the Danish
Constitution as regards the system for judicial appointments.
135. Countries that have done so as of the time of writing include Albania, Arme-
nia, Croatia, Greece, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania,
Switzerland, Tunisia, and Ukraine.
136. ECHR, supra note 51, art. 26(4); Eur. Ct. H.R. Rules of Court, Rule 24(2)(b)
(last amended June 1, 2015). See also the Statute of the International Court of Justice
art. 31, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (giving the parties to the case
the right to have a judge of their nationality sit on the bench).
137. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 132, art. 42(10(b).
138. As required under CE, Venice Comm'n, Revised Rules of Procedure, supra
note 34, art. 3a.
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B. The Articulation of the "Common Constitutional Heritage":
From Principles to Their Operationalization?
We have seen that, when evaluating proposed constitutional re-
forms, the Venice Commission is guided by the notion of the "common
constitutional heritage," comprising the rule of law, fundamental
rights, and democracy. Making these yardsticks fully operational re-
quires the identification and articulation of their more specific
constituent elements. In doing so, the Commission exhibits a growing
tendency to move beyond the level of principles to their mise en oeu-
vre. To illustrate: in its Icelandic opinion, the Venice Commission did
not only insist on the need to uphold the principle of judicial indepen-
dence as a tenet of the common heritage. It went further, suggesting
that this could primarily be done through a particular institutional
arrangement, viz. the establishment of an independent judicial coun-
cil with decisive influence on judicial appointment decisions. 139
Similarly, several Commission members have argued that the com-
mon heritage encompasses the notion of constitutional supremacy,
which they consider to require that courts-as opposed to non-judi-
cial bodies-be given the power to verify the constitutionality of
legislation. 140 The creeping inclination to describe the facets of the
common heritage in ever-greater detail can in all likelihood be attrib-
uted to the belief that this enhances the value of its services to
constitution-making societies. Instead of limiting itself to bland
statements about the importance of respecting abstract constitu-
tional principles, the Venice Commission is seeking to explicitly
address how such principles should be implemented in order to en-
sure their practical realization. Such good intentions and noble
motives notwithstanding, this Subpart suggests, however, that sub-
scribing to an overly broad catalogue of elements that together make
up the common heritage is misconceived and could in the long run
even become a cause for disenchantment with the Venice Commis-
sion's constitutional guidance and its approach to providing it. A
more diversified analytical framework is proposed as a possible
remedy.
The most intuitively plausible claim in favor of some modicum of
moderation in fleshing out the contents of the common heritage has
to do with legitimacy. The prevalence of external actors participating
139. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 702/2013 on the Draft New Constitution of Ice-
land, supra note 44, particularly 135.
140. See, e.g., Hanna Suchocka, Europe's Constitutional Heritage and Social Differ-
ences, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF EUROPE (SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF
DEMOCRACY, No. 18), supra note 36, at 59. Contra Buquicchio & Garrone, supra note
36, at 11 (finding that at the time of their writing, judicial constitutionality control
was not yet part of the common heritage, while noting that the dynamic character of
the latter concept meant that this could very well happen in due course).
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in domestic constitution writing or amendment processes today14 1
makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that this is not an uncontrover-
sial practice as a matter of legal theory and international law. As
observed in a recent handbook, "a constitution might be thought al-
most necessarily autochthonous."'1 42 Its drafting involves the exercise
of a people's right to internal self-determination and has been de-
scribed in a 2009 UN policy note on the provision of assistance to
constitution-making processes as "a sovereign national process,
which, to be legitimate and successful, must be nationally owned and
led."1 43 When the standards of the common heritage are expanded to
cover both constitutional principles and their implementation, states
may feel that their autonomy in fashioning constitutional arrange-
ments is unduly circumscribed, notably bearing in mind the soft
power that Venice Commission opinions typically enjoy. A further
likely corollary would be more frequent findings that proposed consti-
tutional arrangements are incompatible with the common heritage-
an unwelcome conclusion for any constitutional framer-which may
have the perverse effect of causing domestic authorities to be more
resistant to taking up the recommendations contained in Commission
opinions. From the perspective of the effectiveness and positive im-
pact of Venice Commission opinions, and ultimately its reputation as
a successful advisor on constitutional matters, either consequence is
obviously undesirable.
The preceding argument dovetails with another that supports re-
straint in including institutional designs in the common heritage:
keeping the focus on principles avoids the trap of undue optimism on
the incidence and extent of constitutional convergence, let alone con-
stitutional universalism.14 4 A theme that is gaining considerable
traction in the constitutional literature concerns the importance of
respecting local ideas and approaches to matters of constitutional de-
sign, when this does not detract from the core tenets of constitutional
law-such as democracy, fundamental rights, and the rule of law,
i.e., the bedrock of the common heritage.1 45 This principle is finding
141. On this phenomenon, see, e.g., A1-Ali, supra note 20.
142. Mark Tushnet, Constitution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 219 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andr~s Saj6 eds., 2012).
143. U.N. Secretary General, Guidance Note, supra note 112, at 2.
144. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Con-
vergence, 11 U. CHI. J. INT'L L. 399 (2011); Jeff Goldsworthy, Questioning the
Migration of Constitutional Ideas: Rights, Constitutionalism and the Limits of Con-
vergence, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 115 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2011);
Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L.
985 (2009).
145. Zaid A1-Ali & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, The Competing Effect of National Uni-
queness and Comparative Influences on Constitutional Practice, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 427 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & Cheryl
Saunders eds., 2013); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 142, at 756.
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its way into legal texts. For instance, Article 4(2) TEU directs the
European Union to "respect the equality of Member States before the
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their funda-
mental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional
and local self-government. 1 46 In a comparable fashion, the 2009 UN
Note cautions that "[tihe options and advice provided must be care-
fully tailored to the local context, recognizing that there is no 'one
size fits all' constitutional model or process.' 47 This rings true in the
context of the Venice Commission as well. Some of the institutional
arrangements treated as apparently belonging to the common heri-
tage in Commission opinions or writings by its individual members
are not actually in place in all the (original) member states. Re-
turning to our earlier examples, neither Germany nor Austria have
delegated judicial appointment decisions to judicial councils, and the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands continue to rely on their par-
liament to uphold the principle of constitutional supremacy instead of
entrusting this task primarily to the courts. Treating institutional
designs as generally endorsed requirements for democratic states
may thus be misleading and may furthermore reduce the inclination
of some countries to tap into the Venice Commission's constitutional
expertise or otherwise participate in its work. To be fair, the Commis-
sion's recent opinion on the new Hungarian Fundamental Law for the
first time referred to "variations of European guarantees [that] may
be seen as part of national constitutional autonomy,"1 48 but it has so
far not elaborated the precise meaning or implications of this notion
for the manner in which it discharges its mandate.
To ward off the risks just described does not require the Venice
Commission to refrain from considering the implementation of consti-
tutional principles altogether. Rather, it is suggested that the
Commission should eschew conceiving of the operationalization of
such principles as part of the common heritage as such. More specifi-
cally, it should maintain a clear distinction between common
constitutional standards and constitutional best practices or guide-
lines. Only the former should be regarded as constituent elements of
the shared heritage that the Venice Commission seeks to safeguard
and realize among its member states. These constitutional standards
should ordinarily be cast at the level of principles, for the reasons set
out earlier. As for their enforcement, standards are properly seen as
146. TEU, supra note 100, art. 4(2) (emphasis added). On the relationship between
the concept of national identity and core tenets of EU law such as supremacy and
uniformity, see, e.g., NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRA-
TION (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013); Armin von
Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Iden-
tity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417 (2011).
147. U.N. Secretary General, Guidance Note, supra note 112, at 4.
148. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 621/2011 on the New Constitution of Hungary,
supra note 94, 19.
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categorical in nature, meaning that the Venice Commission should
continue to unequivocally insist on member states' compliance with
these paradigms of constitutional law. 149 In contrast, the institu-
tional arrangements, processes, and related approaches available to
realize the common heritage are best seen as constitutional best prac-
tices or guidelines. As these terms imply, the Commission can, and
probably should, encourage countries to emulate what it considers to
be good benchmarks in this regard. At the same time, best practices
and guidelines lack the absoluteness that characterizes constitu-
tional standards; they admit of exceptions and room for national
variation. States accordingly should have more latitude in deciding
whether to follow recommendations to this effect, and if they do not-
presumably because a certain mode of implementation of the common
heritage does not fit within their particular historical, legal, and po-
litical context-this does not warrant disapprobation by the Venice
Commission or other countries.
A good example that illustrates several of the points highlighted
in the preceding paragraphs is that of a 2010 Commission report on
judicial independence 150 and the use of that report in the subsequent
opinion on Iceland's proposed new constitution, more particularly in
assessing the regime governing judicial appointments. The aim of the
report was to present an overview of existing "European standards"
and identify areas for further development. 151 It should be noted that
in commenting on the appropriate approach to several issues pertain-
ing to judicial independence, the report uses language that is more
usually associated with best practices than genuine standards, such
as the phrase that it "strongly recommends" a particular institutional
arrangement. A similar approach can be discerned in relation to the
topic of judicial appointments, with the report noting in its main
body:
[I]t is the Venice Commission's view that it is an appropriate
method for guaranteeing ... the independence of the judici-
ary that an independent judicial council have decisive
influence on decisions on the appointment and career of
judges. Owing to the richness of legal culture in Europe,
which is precious and should be safeguarded, there is no sin-
gle model which applies to all countries. While respecting
the variety of legal systems, the Venice Commission recom-
mends that states which have not yet done so consider the
149. Cf Diirr, supra note 5, at 158.
150. CE, Venice Comm'n, Report on the Independence of the Judicial System-
Part 1: The Independence of Judges, supra note 53.
151. Id. 1, 10.
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establishment of an independent judicial council or similar
body.152
In the report's conclusions, this first sentence is repeated as part of a
paragraph the opening lines of which read: "The following standards
should be respected by states in order to ensure internal and external
judicial independence." 153 Cue the Icelandic opinion, where the rap-
porteurs glossed over the latter part of the section reproduced above
and appeared more influenced by the use of the term "standards" in
the 2010 report. The proposed Icelandic model of combined executive
and parliamentary appointments was rejected as unacceptable
"under the European standards" and the domestic authorities were
instructed to give priority to "securing a strong judicial council
model" instead.'54 This does not sit well with the Venice Commis-
sion's own admission that there is no single European approach when
it comes to hiring decisions and that this, moreover, is not objectiona-
ble but rather a cherished reflection of national constitutional
diversity. While the Venice Commission was right in insisting on re-
spect for the principle of judicial independence as a crucial
component of the common heritage in both the 2010 report and the
Icelandic opinion, it would thus have been preferable had it consist-
ently used the terminology of good practices when it came to its
favored implementation of this constitutional standard.
There is one further aspect pertaining to the Commission's hold-
ing up of institutional or procedural designs as worthy of emulation
by its constituent members to be considered. The case studies have
demonstrated that the Venice Commission includes horizontal com-
parative references in its opinions, but that its practice in this regard
is currently suboptimal. Several occasions were identified where a
mention of foreign models or practices could have supported the Com-
mission's viewpoint (e.g., the Icelandic opinion) or provided more
guidance to domestic constitution makers (e.g., the Tunisian opinion),
but where no such references were given. Addressing this weakness
should not be the sole responsibility of the relevant rapporteurs; they
cannot be presumed to possess the requisite detailed knowledge
about constitutional arrangements and their functioning in each of
the sixty member states. It is suggested that the Venice Commis-
sion's recently established Scientific Council can play a valuable role
here. This body is expected to contribute to the "high quality and con-
sistency" of the Commission's studies and opinions,' 55 and inter alia,
152. Id. 32 (original emphasis omitted and new emphasis added).
153. Id. 82 (emphasis added).
154. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 702/2013 on the Draft New Constitution of Ice-
land, supra note 44, 139.
155. CE, Venice Comm'n, Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 17a. This
provision was added by the Plenary in late 2013. The decision to establish the Scien-
tific Council was taken in late 2009.
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it prepares "thematic compilations" of the Venice Commission's doc-
trine as reference guides for interested parties. 156 Requiring that all
draft opinions on proposed constitutional reforms be submitted to the
Scientific Council for recommendations on possible references to for-
eign models and designs would accordingly fit in with the tasks given
to this body and may in the long run enhance the quality and useful-
ness of the thematic compilations.
C. Coping with the Venice Commission's Geographical Expansion
Since its establishment, the Venice Commission's membership
has grown exponentially. Starting with eighteen constituent coun-
tries in 1990, all located in Western Europe, it today has sixty full
members, from across Europe and beyond. This rapid enlargement
has brought about more heterogeneity in the Commission's member-
ship: aside from geographical variations, the constitutional systems
and values that undergird them differ among the states. It has been
rightly observed that the continuous broadening of the Venice Com-
mission's circle of members "is an explosive issue ... that still needs
to be defused."157 This Subpart focuses on one particular challenge in
this regard, viz. ensuring respect for representativeness when dis-
pensing constitutional advice and countering sentiments that the
rights and obligations of membership may vary depending on the ma-
turity of a state's constitutional order. To be clear, this challenge is
not unique to the Venice Commission: other international bodies or
organizations too have faced or are at present confronted with ques-
tions as to how to achieve equal treatment, or at least the perception
thereof. Think for instance of the long-running debate about whether
African and Arab states should be given a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, counterbalancing the current dominance of West-
ern nations.158 Consider also how the EU has been criticized for
holding candidates for accession to higher standards than those ap-
plied to existing members and for requiring that new entrants meet
standards of economic performance that the older states never had to
contend with.1 59 These examples confirm just how germane the chal-
lenge of expanding membership is to international bodies.
In the case of the Venice Commission, a first issue for reform
pertains to the need for working groups to reflect its geographical re-
ality. Here the concern is not with the appointment of non-legal
experts, as in Subpart A above, but with the dominance of rap-
156. CE, Venice Comm'n, Annual Report of Activities 2013, supra note 115, at 7.
157. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 17, at 584.
158. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Calling for Security Council Re-
form, General Assembly President Proposes Advisory Group to Move Process
Forward, U.N. Press Release GA/l 1450 (Nov. 7, 2013).
159. See, e.g., ALISON DuxBURy, THE PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS: THE ROLE OF HuMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 155-57 (2013).
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porteurs hailing from Western Europe. In the case studies examined
earlier, every working group chiefly (and in the case of Iceland even
exclusively) comprised rapporteurs from these jurisdictions. Whether
this is a matter of deliberate choice or unintended happenstance, the
practice should be reviewed. On the one hand, there is anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that rapporteurs from newer democracies may be
less sanguine about proposals for constitutional reform than their
counterparts from the "old democracies." 160 Including representa-
tives of the "younger democracies" may thus improve the rigor with
which constitutional reforms are assessed. On the other hand, the
current practice creates the impression that these Western countries
primarily act as seasoned constitutional experts eager and willing to
explain to their less knowledgeable and less experienced non-West-
ern counterparts how the latter ought to fashion their constitutional
systems. Such neocolonial or missionary thinking is pedantic and
does little to foster an esprit de corps among the member states.
Moreover, those states that are members of both the Venice Commis-
sion and the Council of Europe would have had to demonstrate
compliance with the common heritage to be considered eligible to join
the latter organization. 161 The individual members appointed by
these countries-well over half of the Commission's constituency-
ought therefore to be presumed competent to act as assessors of en-
visaged constitutional reforms.
To enhance the representative character of working groups, it is
suggested that the Commission's President ought to observe the prin-
ciple of regional proportionality when appointing rapporteurs. This
would entail making sure that rapporteurs are drawn from the vari-
ous geographical "blocs" that make up the Commission's constituency
in appropriate proportions. This principle should ideally find expres-
sion in the Rules of Procedure, mirroring the approach adopted by,
for instance, the European Court of Human Rights162-a fellow
Council of Europe body-and the Human Rights Committee under
the ICCPR.163
Moving from the supply of to the demand for of constitutional
guidance, another issue that warrants attention is the infrequency
with which Western European countries are the subject of Venice
Commission opinions. Of the eighteen original member states, only
160. Jowell, supra note 8, at 676-77.
161. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 25, arts. 3, 4.
162. Eur. Ct. H.R. Rules of Court, supra note 136, Rule 25(2) (".. . The composition
of the Sections shall be geographically and gender balanced and shall reflect the dif-
ferent legal systems among the Contracting Parties.").
163. ICCPR, supra note 132, art. 31(2) ("In the election of the [Human Rights Com-
mittee], consideration shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of
membership and to the representation of the different forms of civilization and of the
principal legal systems.").
20151 1005
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
seven have made use of its services as of late 2015164-with the Ven-
ice Commission evaluating the constitutional reforms of one other
founding member at the request of the Council of Europe's Parlia-
mentary Assembly rather than the respective domestic
authorities. 165 One may venture that this reticence to tap into the
Commission's expertise is due to a perception of the body as one
whose purpose is to provide advice to younger or fledgling democra-
cies; and which hence has no real role to play in relation to older
constitutional systems. Such thinking is, however, misconceived. Ma-
ture constitutional arrangements are not immune to revision, as
demonstrated inter alia by the Belgian case study and the compre-
hensive reform of the French Constitution in 2008, which sought to
recalibrate the relationship between parliament and the executive
and grant the judiciary more power to protect individuals' fundamen-
tal rights from encroachment. 166 There is no good reason for states
with established constitutional orders-and it would arguably even
be hubristic-not to consider seeking the input of an independent ad-
visor on constitutional matters with a solid track record in this
domain. In addition, novel constitutional dilemmas-for instance
those pertaining to privacy and new technologies or growing mul-
ticulturalism in our societies-are faced by "old" and "new(er)"
democracies alike and should provide incentives for all constitution
makers to look beyond their borders for possible guidance. Aside from
considerations pertaining to the quality of constitutional reforms, if
the Venice Commission were to increase its involvement with the
older members, it could also forestall domestic criticism to the effect
that the latter contribute heavily to the Commission without receiv-
ing much, if anything, in return.
The need to make itself more visible and politically relevant to
its longer-standing members has not entirely escaped the Commis-
sion's attention. In a 2004 opinion, it observed that promoting and
strengthening democracy could be done inter alia by "making fuller
use of [its] expertise also with regard to the functioning of the demo-
cratic institutions in the older [Council of Europe's] member
states."' 67 A decade on, this statement has, however, failed to gener-
ate any concrete initiatives. To be fair, the Venice Commission lacks
the competence to examine envisaged domestic constitutional re-
164. Namely Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Switzerland, and
Turkey.
165. Namely Belgium.
166. Loi constitutionnelle n' 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des in-
stitutions de la Ve R6publique [Constitutional Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the
Modernization of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic), JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA Rp-
PUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 24, 2008, p. 11890.
167. CE, Venice Comm'n, Opinion 282/2004 on the Possible Follow-up to Parlia-
mentary Assembly Recommendation 1629(2003) on "Future of Democracy:
Strengthening Democratic Institutions", Doc. CDL(2004)015 (Mar. 22, 2004).
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forms sua sponte. Still, this does not mean that there is nothing to be
done. The Commission ought to be much more explicit in signaling to
those that do have the competence to request its opinions-including
the member states in question-that it welcomes the opportunity to
participate in constitutional reform processes in Western European
countries. It can do so in its annual reports and on its website, to
complement the present emphasis on its endeavors in Central and
Eastern Europe and its eagerness for deepening collaboration with
non-European countries. In addition, the Venice Commission should
look into organizing more conferences, seminars, and the like in the
older member states. Such activities can perform a useful "outreach"
function, given that "in some Western European countries the [Ven-
ice Commission] is hardly known among journalists and
politicians."168 By actively seeking to increase familiarity with its ex-
istence and work and to correct any misperceptions that its role is
confined to young and adolescent democracies, the Commission will
enhance the likelihood of its assistance also being solicited by its
founding members.
The Commission's geographical expansion, finally, has impor-
tant ramifications for the substantive yardsticks and guidelines used
in assessing proposed reforms that presently remain undervalued.
We have seen that rapporteurs regularly rely on such standards or
best practices contained in Commission reports and studies to but-
tress their analysis and recommendations. The propriety of doing so
is premised on such documents accurately reflecting the state of the
law. This does not always appear to be the case. Thus, in the case
studies canvassed earlier, the rapporteurs and later the Plenary re-
lied on Commission documents prepared as early as 2007 without
discussing the manner in which the eight-mainly non-European-
states that had joined in the interim deal with the relevant constitu-
tional topic. The corollary is that the standards or best practices
enunciated in country-specific opinions drawn up in 2014 or later
may be based on documents that are no longer fully representative
and respectful of the classic notion of equality among the member
states. This is an unattractive prospect. In response, rapporteurs
should be required to verify whether the reports they intend to use
for empirical support accurately capture the state of the law for the
Commission's entire membership. If not, the findings contained
therein should be supplemented with information concerning coun-
tries that have in the meantime acceded to the Commission. In
carrying out this task, the rapporteurs should be assisted by the Sci-
entific Council mentioned earlier and, where necessary, should
engage the individual Commission members for the state in question,
168. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 17, at 585.
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as they will undoubtedly possess the necessary knowledge about the
functioning of their state's constitutional system.
In sum, addressing the three issues highlighted in this section is
imperative for safeguarding a sense of cohesion and equality of treat-
ment among Commission member states, and will be instrumental
for ensuring the continuous legitimacy of this transnational body,
while its geographical expansion continues unabated.
CONCLUSION
The Venice Commission is today no longer an institutional struc-
ture devoted to bringing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
(back) into the liberal democratic fold. Rather, with a membership
now comprising non-European states and a marked increase in its
activities in African and Central Asian countries, there are prospects
and aspirations for its further evolution into a body with a genuinely
universal dimension to its activities. Such a development can be her-
alded as being in keeping with the times. Recent decades have seen
countries around the world embarking upon processes of democrati-
zation and redesigning their constitutional frameworks. In
implementing these constitutional projects, constitution makers are
increasingly influenced by foreign models and ideas and receptive to
guidance from external actors. The Venice Commission can perform a
useful function as a repository and dispensary of liberal democratic
constitutional principles and values. While we can acknowledge that
the flexible and pragmatic approach adopted by the Commission in
preparing opinions has served it well to date, several changes should
however be considered to enable this body to optimize its role as an
external constitutional advisor. The analysis presented in this Article
provides support for a more precise and elaborate set of procedural
rules, while also cautioning against an overly ambitious approach
when articulating the components that make up the shared constitu-
tional heritage. It further shows that the Commission should take
care to maintain sufficient esprit de corps among its members as it
becomes more geographically heterogeneous and to proactively de-
velop policies to this end. Addressing these matters along the lines
suggested in this Article will give the work of the Venice Commission
a sounder normative footing, enhance the quality and consistency of
its opinions, and bolster its legitimacy. This, in turn, should allow the
Commission to stand in good stead as guardian of the common consti-
tutional heritage for many years to come.
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